Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (repealed)Dangos y teitl llawn

Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (repealed)

ANNEX IIICALCULATING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN-EXCHANGE RISK

1.If the sum of an institution's overall net foreign‐exchange position and its net gold position, calculated in accordance with the procedure set out in point 2, exceeds 2 % of its total own funds, it shall multiply the sum of its net foreign‐exchange position and its net gold position by 8 % in order to calculate its own‐funds requirement against foreign‐exchange risk.

2.A two‐stage calculation shall be used for capital requirements for foreign‐exchange risk.

2.1.Firstly, the institution's net open position in each currency (including the reporting currency) and in gold shall be calculated.

This net open position shall consist of the sum of the following elements (positive or negative):

(a)

the net spot position (i.e. all asset items less all liability items, including accrued interest, in the currency in question or, for gold, the net spot position in gold);

(b)

the net forward position (i.e. all amounts to be received less all amounts to be paid under forward exchange and gold transactions, including currency and gold futures and the principal on currency swaps not included in the spot position);

(c)

irrevocable guarantees (and similar instruments) that are certain to be called and likely to be irrecoverable;

(d)

net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already fully hedged (at the discretion of the reporting institution and with the prior consent of the competent authorities, net future income/expenses not yet entered in accounting records but already fully hedged by forward foreign‐exchange transactions may be included here). Such discretion must be exercised on a consistent basis;

(e)

the net delta (or delta‐based) equivalent of the total book of foreign‐currency and gold options; and

(f)

the market value of other (i.e. non‐foreign-currency and non‐gold) options.

Any positions which an institution has deliberately taken in order to hedge against the adverse effect of the exchange rate on its capital ratio may be excluded from the calculation of net open currency positions. Such positions should be of a non‐trading or structural nature and their exclusion, and any variation of the terms of their exclusion, shall require the consent of the competent authorities. The same treatment subject to the same conditions as above may be applied to positions which an institution has which relate to items that are already deducted in the calculation of own funds.

For the purposes of the calculation referred to in the first paragraph, in respect of CIUs the actual foreign exchange positions of the CIU shall be taken into account. Institutions may rely on third party reporting of the foreign exchange positions in the CIU, where the correctness of this report is adequately ensured. If an institution is not aware of the foreign exchange positions in a CIU, it shall be assumed that the CIU is invested up to the maximum extent allowed under the CIU's mandate in foreign exchange and institutions shall, for trading book positions, take account of the maximum indirect exposure that they could achieve by taking leveraged positions through the CIU when calculating their capital requirement for foreign exchange risk. This shall be done by proportionally increasing the position in the CIU up to the maximum exposure to the underlying investment items resulting from the investment mandate. The assumed position of the CIU in foreign exchange shall be treated as a separate currency according to the treatment of investments in gold, subject to the modification that, if the direction of the CIU's investment is available, the total long position may be added to the total long open foreign exchange position and the total short position may be added to the total short open foreign exchange position. There would be no netting allowed between such positions prior to the calculation.

The competent authorities shall have the discretion to allow institutions to use the net present value when calculating the net open position in each currency and in gold.

2.2.Secondly, net short and long positions in each currency other than the reporting currency and the net long or short position in gold shall be converted at spot rates into the reporting currency. They shall then be summed separately to form the total of the net short positions and the total of the net long positions respectively. The higher of these two totals shall be the institution's overall net foreign‐exchange position.

3.By derogation from points 1 and 2 and pending further coordination, the competent authorities may prescribe or allow institutions to use the following procedures for the purposes of this Annex.

3.1.The competent authorities may allow institutions to provide lower capital requirements against positions in closely correlated currencies than those which would result from applying points 1 and 2 to them. The competent authorities may deem a pair of currencies to be closely correlated only if the likelihood of a loss — calculated on the basis of daily exchange‐rate data for the preceding three or five years — occurring on equal and opposite positions in such currencies over the following 10 working days, which is 4 % or less of the value of the matched position in question (valued in terms of the reporting currency) has a probability of at least 99 %, when an observation period of three years is used, or 95 %, when an observation period of five years is used. The own‐funds requirement on the matched position in two closely correlated currencies shall be 4 % multiplied by the value of the matched position. The capital requirement on unmatched positions in closely correlated currencies, and all positions in other currencies, shall be 8 %, multiplied by the higher of the sum of the net short or the net long positions in those currencies after the removal of matched positions in closely correlated currencies.

3.2.The competent authorities may allow institutions to remove positions in any currency which is subject to a legally binding intergovernmental agreement to limit its variation relative to other currencies covered by the same agreement from whichever of the methods described in points 1, 2 and 3.1 that they apply. Institutions shall calculate their matched positions in such currencies and subject them to a capital requirement no lower than half of the maximum permissible variation laid down in the intergovernmental agreement in question in respect of the currencies concerned. Unmatched positions in those currencies shall be treated in the same way as other currencies.

By derogation from the first paragraph, the competent authorities may allow the capital requirement on the matched positions in currencies of Member States participating in the second stage of the economic and monetary union to be 1,6 %, multiplied by the value of such matched positions.

4.Net positions in composite currencies may be broken down into the component currencies according to the quotas in force.