ANNEX IIU.K. UNION SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME
PART IU.K. AVIAN INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE IN POULTRY AND WILD BIRDS
Section 1 U.K. General approach and requirements
1.TERRITORIAL SCOPEU.K.
Surveillance in poultry and wild birds must be implemented in all Member States.
2.PERIOD OF APPLICATIONU.K.
Until revoked.
3.GENERAL APPROACHU.K.
The surveillance system must address the objectives provided for in Section 2 and must be built on a comprehensive approach including different components of surveillance activities complementing each other in poultry and wild bird populations:
Section 2 U.K. Objectives for surveillance in poultry and wild birds
1.Early detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry.U.K.
2.Early detection of HPAI in wild birds providing for:U.K.
(a)
an early warning for possible HPAI introduction into poultry, in particular when viruses enter the Union through migratory movements of wild birds;
(b)
information for the assessment of risks for virus spread following findings of HPAI in wild birds.
3.Detection of HPAI in poultry species which generally do not show significant clinical signs.U.K.
4.Detection of circulating low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) that may easily spread between poultry flocks in particular in areas with a high density of poultry establishments in view of their potential to mutate to HPAI in order to:U.K.
(a)
identify clusters of infection with LPAIV; and
(b)
monitor the risk of spread of LPAIV by movements of poultry and by fomites in certain production systems at risk.
5.Contribution to increased knowledge on HPAI and LPAIV posing a potential zoonotic risk.U.K.
Section 3 U.K. Early detection of HPAI in poultry
1.The early detection systems for of HPAI in poultry must be part of the general surveillance requirements as provided for in point (a) of Article 3(1) and must be implemented throughout the poultry sector.U.K.
2.The surveillance referred to in point 1 must at least include the early detection and investigation in establishments located in an area identified as being at heightened risk for HPAI introduction and spread, of:U.K.
(a)
any change in normal production and health parameters such as mortality rate, feed and water intake and egg production; and
(b)
any clinical sign or post-mortem lesion suggesting HPAI.
3.Regular testing of samples collected from dead and sick poultry in establishments located in an area identified as being at heightened risk for HPAI introduction and spread may also be relevant when an increased risk has been identified at national, EU or regional level due to outbreaks of HPAI in poultry and/or wild birds.U.K.
Section 4 U.K. Early detection of HPAI in wild birds
1.The early detection of HPAI in wild birds must be based on sampling and testing of birds that have been:U.K.
(b)
found injured or sick;
(c)
hunted with clinical signs.
This surveillance may need to be increased, when HPAI has been detected in wild birds, by monitoring systems using organised patrols for detecting and collecting dead and sick birds.
2.The design of this surveillance must be risk-based, taking into account at least relevant information on ornithology, virology, epidemiology and environmental matters.U.K.
3.The surveillance must apply to birds from targeted wild bird species, as provided for in Section 8. However, all suspected episodes of mortality in wild birds must be investigated to exclude HPAI.U.K.
In addition to targeted wild bird species, additional wild bird species may also be included when their specific epidemiological relevance on the Member State’s territory has been assessed.
4.In addition, the surveillance may include, at priority locations and key sites in particular those where birds of targeted wild birds species are entering the Union during their migratory movements, at least from North-East and Eastern routes, the sampling and testing of:U.K.
5.Additional sources of information obtained from investigations of wild birds in the context of HPAI outbreaks in kept birds must be included in the results of the surveillance of HPAI in wild birds.U.K.
Section 5 U.K. Risk-based complementary surveillance for HPAI in poultry species which generally do not show significant clinical signs
1.The risk-based surveillance for infection with HPAI in poultry establishments keeping ducks, geese, poultry belonging to the species of Anseriformes for supplies of game or quails to be released into the wild must take into account at least the following risk factors:U.K.
(a)
the historical and current epidemiological situation of the disease and its evolution over time in poultry and wild birds;
(b)
the proximity of establishments to water bodies and other places where migratory birds, in particular water birds, may gather in higher numbers or have their stop-over places during their movements into and through the Union;
(c)
the period of increased movements of migratory wild birds of targeted species into and through the Union;
(d)
the structure of poultry farming including the broader sector involved in the different production systems;
(e)
the geographical location of the establishments in an area with a high density of poultry;
(f)
the biosecurity practices on the establishments;
(g)
the type and frequency of movements of poultry, products and vehicles transporting poultry and trade patterns; and
(h)
the risk assessments and scientific advice in relation to the relevance of the spread of HPAI by wild birds.
2.Based on scientific justifications, additional risk factors than those listed in points (a) to (h) of point 1 may be included and factors that are not relevant for the specific situation of the Member State may be omitted.U.K.
Section 6 U.K. risk-based surveillance in order to identify clusters of establishments infected with lpaiv and with continuous spread of LPAIV
1.The risk-based surveillance for the detection of circulating low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) that may easily spread between poultry flocks in particular in areas with a high density of poultry establishments, as referred to in point 4 of Section 2, must apply to poultry establishments for which the competent authority has assessed that clusters of infection with LPAIV have repeatedly occurred in the past or are deemed more likely to occur.U.K.
2.Such clusters are characterised by infection with LPAIV of groups of establishments related in time and geographical proximity.U.K.
3.The assessment for the selection of establishments for targeted surveillance must take into account the risk for lateral transmission of the virus due to the structure and complexity of the production system and functional connections between establishments, in particular when operating in areas with a high density of establishments.U.K.
4.In addition to the selection criteria for targeted surveillance of establishments referred to in point 3, the following risk factors must be taken into account at the establishment level:U.K.
(b)
the cycle and duration of production;
(c)
presence of several poultry species;
(d)
presence of multi-age poultry flocks;
(e)
presence of long-lived poultry;
(f)
practice of all-in all-out principle;
(g)
length of waiting period between batches; and
(h)
biosecurity practices and housing conditions.
Section 7 U.K. Targeted poultry populations
1.Early detection systems for infection with HPAI referred to in Section 3 must apply to all poultry populations.U.K.
2.Complementary surveillance for infection with HPAI referred to in Section 5 in poultry species that do generally not display significant signs when infected with HPAI must apply to:U.K.
(f)
poultry of species belonging to Anseriformes for supplies of game to be released into the wild.
3.In addition to the species and categories listed under point 2 the targeting of sampling and testing for infection with LPAIV referred to in Section 6 may apply to the following poultry species and production categories:U.K.
(a)
laying hens including those kept in free-range;
(d)
the poultry of species belonging to Galliformes for supplies of game to be released into the wild.
Section 8 U.K. Targeted Wild bird populations
Targeted wild birds species, in particular migratory water birds have shown to be at higher risk of becoming infected with, and transmitting HPAI.
The list of ‘wild bird targeted species’ compiled and updated in the light of the most recent knowledge is available on the website of the EURL.
Section 9 U.K. Sampling and laboratory testing methods
1.The number of poultry establishments to be sampled and the number of poultry to be tested per establishment and, as appropriate, by epidemiological unit (e.g. poultry flock, shed, etc.) on the concerned establishment must be based on a statistically valid sampling method. This method may be that used for representative sampling; i.e. an estimated prevalence to be detected according to a pre-defined level of confidence determined by the competent authority.U.K.
2.Frequency and period for testing:U.K.
(a)
the frequency for sampling and testing of poultry establishments must be determined based on the outcome of a risk assessment by the competent authority;
(b)
the time period for sampling must coincide with seasonal production for each production category, but must not compromise the risk-based surveillance approach;
(c)
when relevant, the time period for sampling must take into account the period of heightened risk as referred to in point 3 of Section 3. Samples must be subjected to laboratory testing by virological methods, when taken for:
(i)
early detection of HPAI in poultry referred to in Section 3;
(ii)
early detection of HPAI in wild birds referred to in Section 4;
(iii)
complementary surveillance for HPAI in poultry species which generally do not show significant clinical signs of HPAI referred to in Section 5;
(iv)
follow-up of sero-positive findings referred to in point 4(b).
For virological testing the prevalence and time window for detection of active infection must be taken into account.
3.Samples must be subjected to laboratory testing by serological methods, when taken for:U.K.
(a)
complementary surveillance for HPAI in poultry species which generally do not show significant clinical signs of HPAI referred to in Section 5 supplementing virological testing, as appropriate;
(b)
detection of clusters of LPAIV infected establishments referred to in Section 6. When for technical reasons or other duly justified reasons sampling for serology is not appropriate, virological testing must be performed.