Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2013
amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 50 and 114 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Whereas:
On 27 May 2010 the Commission adopted a report on the operation of Directive 2004/109/EC which identified areas where the regime created by that Directive could be improved. In particular, the report demonstrates the need to provide for the simplification of certain issuers’ obligations with a view to making regulated markets more attractive to small and medium-sized issuers raising capital in the Union. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the existing transparency regime needs to be improved, in particular with respect to the disclosure of corporate ownership.
In addition, in its communication of 13 April 2011 entitled ‘Single Market Act, Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence, Working together to create new growth’, the Commission identified the need to review Directive 2004/109/EC in order to make the obligations applicable to listed small and medium-sized enterprises more proportionate, whilst guaranteeing the same level of investor protection.
According to the Commission report and the Commission communication, the administrative burden associated with obligations linked to admission to trading on a regulated market should be reduced for small and medium-sized issuers in order to improve their access to capital. The obligations to publish interim management statements or quarterly financial reports represent an important burden for many small and medium-sized issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on regulated markets, without being necessary for investor protection. Those obligations also encourage short-term performance and discourage long-term investment. In order to encourage sustainable value creation and long-term oriented investment strategy, it is essential to reduce short-term pressure on issuers and give investors an incentive to adopt a longer term vision. The requirement to publish interim management statements should therefore be abolished.
Member States should not be allowed to impose in their national legislation the requirement to publish periodic financial information on a more frequent basis than annual financial reports and half-yearly financial reports. However, Member States should nevertheless be able to require issuers to publish additional periodic financial information if such a requirement does not constitute a significant financial burden, and if the additional information required is proportionate to the factors that contribute to investment decisions. This Directive is without prejudice to any additional information that is required by sectoral Union legislation, and in particular Member States can require the publication of additional periodic financial information by financial institutions. Moreover, a regulated market can require issuers which have their securities admitted to trading thereon to publish additional periodic financial information in all or some of the segments of that market.
In order to provide additional flexibility and thereby reduce administrative burdens, the deadline for publishing half-yearly financial reports should be extended to three months after the end of the reporting period. As the period in which issuers can publish their half-yearly financial reports is extended, small and medium-sized issuers’ reports are expected to receive more attention from the market participants, and thereby those issuers become more visible.
For the purposes of transparency and investor protection, Member States should require the following principles to apply to reporting on payments to governments in accordance with Chapter 10 of Directive 2013/34/EU: materiality (any payment, whether made as a single payment or a series of related payments, need not be taken into account in the report if it is below EUR 100 000 within a financial year); government and project-by-project reporting (reporting on payments to governments should be done on a government and project-by-project basis); universality (no exemptions, for instance for issuers active in certain countries, should be made which have a distortive impact and allow issuers to exploit lax transparency requirements); comprehensiveness (all relevant payments to governments should be reported, in line with Chapter 10 of Directive 2013/34/EU and supporting recitals).
Financial innovation has led to the creation of new types of financial instruments that give investors economic exposure to companies, the disclosure of which has not been provided for in Directive 2004/109/EC. Those instruments could be used to secretly acquire stocks in companies, which could result in market abuse and give a false and misleading picture of economic ownership of publicly listed companies. In order to ensure that issuers and investors have full knowledge of the structure of corporate ownership, the definition of financial instruments in that Directive should cover all instruments with similar economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to acquire shares.
Financial instruments with similar economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to acquire shares which provide for cash settlement should be calculated on a ‘delta-adjusted’ basis, by multiplying the notional amount of underlying shares by the delta of the instrument. Delta indicates how much a financial instrument’s theoretical value would move in the event of variation in the underlying instrument’s price and provides an accurate picture of the exposure of the holder to the underlying instrument. This approach is taken in order to ensure that the information about the total voting rights accessible by the investor is as accurate as possible.
In addition, in order to ensure adequate transparency of major holdings, where a holder of financial instruments exercises its entitlement to acquire shares and the total holdings of voting rights attaching to underlying shares exceed the notification threshold without affecting the overall percentage of the previously notified holdings, a new notification should be required to disclose the change in the nature of the holdings.
In order to take account of technical developments, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be delegated to the Commission to specify the contents of notification of major holdings of financial instruments. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.
To facilitate cross-border investment, investors should be able to easily access regulated information for all listed companies in the Union. However, the current network of officially appointed national mechanisms for the central storage of regulated information does not ensure an easy search for such information across the Union. In order to ensure cross-border access to information and to take account of technical developments in financial markets and in communication technologies, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to specify minimum standards for dissemination of regulated information, access to regulated information at Union level and the mechanisms for the central storage of regulated information. The Commission, with assistance of ESMA, should also be empowered to take measures to improve the functioning of the network of officially appointed national storage mechanisms and to develop technical criteria for access to regulated information at Union level, in particular, concerning the operation of a central access point for the search for regulated information at Union level. ESMA should develop and operate a web portal serving as a European electronic access point (‘the access point’).
Member States should be able to provide for additional sanctions or measures and for higher levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions than those provided for in Directive 2004/109/EC, having regard to the need for sufficiently dissuasive sanctions in order to support clean and transparent markets. The provisions regarding sanctions, and those regarding the publication of administrative sanctions, do not constitute a precedent for other Union legislation, in particular for more serious regulatory breaches.
In order to ensure that decisions imposing an administrative measure or sanction have a dissuasive effect on the public at large, they should normally be published. The publication of decisions is also an important tool to inform market participants of what behaviour is considered to be in violation of Directive 2004/109/EC and to promote wider good behaviour amongst market participants. However if the publication of a decision would seriously jeopardise the stability of the financial system or an ongoing official investigation or would, in so far as can be determined, cause disproportionate and serious damage to the institutions or individuals involved, or where, in the event that the sanction is imposed on a natural person, publication of personal data is shown to be disproportionate by an obligatory prior assessment of the proportionality of such publication, the competent authority should be able to decide to delay such publication or to publish the information on an anonymous basis.
In order to clarify the treatment of non-listed securities represented by depository receipts admitted to trading on a regulated market and in order to avoid transparency gaps, the definition of ‘issuer’ should be further specified to include issuers of non-listed securities represented by depository receipts admitted to trading on a regulated market. It is also appropriate to amend the definition of ‘issuer’ taking into account the fact that in some Member States issuers of securities admitted to trading on a regulated market can be natural persons.
All issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the Union should be supervised by a competent authority of a Member State to ensure that they comply with their obligations. Issuers who, under Directive 2004/109/EC, have to choose their home Member State but who have not done so, can avoid being supervised by any competent authority in the Union. Therefore, Directive 2004/109/EC should be amended to determine a home Member State for issuers that have not disclosed their choice of home Member State to the competent authorities within a three-month period. In such cases, the home Member State should be the Member State where the issuer’s securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market. Where the securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in more than one Member State, all those Member States will be home Member States until the issuer chooses, and discloses, a single home Member State. This would become an incentive for such issuers to choose and disclose their choice of home Member State to the relevant competent authorities, and in the meantime competent authorities would no longer lack the necessary powers to intervene until an issuer has disclosed its choice of home Member State.
Under Directive 2004/109/EC, in the case of an issuer of debt securities the denomination per unit of which is EUR 1 000 or more, the issuer’s choice of a home Member State is valid for three years. However, where an issuer’s securities are no longer admitted to trading on the regulated market in the issuer’s home Member State and remain admitted to trading in one or more host Member States, such issuer has no relationship with the home Member State originally chosen by it where that is not the Member State of its registered office. Such issuer should be able to choose one of its host Member States or the Member State where it has its registered office as its new home Member State before the expiration of the three-year period. The same possibility of choosing a new home Member State would also apply to a third-country issuer of debt securities the denomination per unit of which is less than EUR 1 000 or of shares whose securities are no longer admitted to trading on the regulated market in the issuer’s home Member State but remain admitted to trading in one or more host Member States.
There should be consistency between Directives 2004/109/EC and 2003/71/EC concerning the definition of the home Member State. In this respect, in order to ensure supervision by the most relevant Member State, Directive 2003/71/EC should be amended to provide for greater flexibility for situations where the securities of an issuer incorporated in a third country are no longer admitted to trading on the regulated market in its home Member State but instead are admitted to trading in one or more other Member States.
This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as enshrined in the Treaty and has to be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles.
Since the objective of this Directive, namely to harmonise the transparency requirements relating to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of its scale or effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
Directives 2004/109/EC, 2003/71/EC and 2007/14/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: