The award of public contracts by or on behalf of Member States’ authorities has to comply with the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular the free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. However, for public contracts above a certain value, provisions should be drawn up coordinating national procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given practical effect and public procurement is opened up to competition.

The notion of acquisition should be understood broadly in the sense of obtaining the benefits of the works, supplies or services in question, not necessarily requiring a transfer of ownership to the contracting authorities. Furthermore, the mere financing, in particular through grants, of an activity, which is frequently linked to the obligation to reimburse the amounts received where they are not used for the purposes intended, does not usually fall within the scope of the public procurement rules. Similarly, situations where all operators fulfilling certain conditions are entitled to perform a given task, without any selectivity, such as customer choice and service voucher systems, should not be understood as being procurement but simple authorisation schemes (for instance licences for medicines or medical services).

It should be recalled that nothing in this Directive obliges Member States to contract out or externalise the provision of services that they wish to provide themselves or to organise by means other than public contracts within the meaning of this Directive. The provision of services based on laws, regulations or employment contracts should not be covered. In some Member States, this might for example be the case for certain administrative and government services such as executive and legislative services or the provision of certain services to the community, such as foreign affairs services or justice services or compulsory social security services.

It should equally be recalled that Member States are free to organise the provision of compulsory social services or of other services such as postal services either as services of general economic interest or as non-economic services of general interest or as a mixture thereof. It is appropriate to clarify that non-economic services of general interest should not fall within the scope of this Directive.

It should finally be recalled that this Directive is without prejudice to the freedom of national, regional and local authorities to define, in conformity with Union law, services of general economic interest, their scope and the characteristics of the service to be provided, including any conditions regarding the quality of the service, in order to pursue their public policy objectives. This Directive should also be without prejudice to the power of national, regional and local authorities to provide, commission and finance services of general economic interest in accordance with Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 on Services of General Interest annexed to the TFEU and to the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In addition, this Directive does not deal with the funding of services of general economic interest or with systems of aid granted by Member States, in particular in the social field, in accordance with Union rules on competition.

However, in view of the diversity of public works contracts, contracting authorities should be able to make provision for contracts for the design and execution of work to be awarded either separately or jointly. This Directive is not intended to prescribe either joint or separate contract awards.

The realisation of a work corresponding to the requirements specified by a contracting authority requires that the authority in question must have taken measures to define the type of the work or, at the very least, have had a decisive influence on its design. Whether the contractor realises all or part of the work by his own means or ensures their realisation by other means should not change the classification of the contract as a works contract, as long as the contractor assumes a direct or indirect obligation that is legally enforceable to ensure that the works will be realised.

Similarly, the condition relating to the origin of the funding of the body considered, has also been examined in the case-law, which has clarified inter alia that being financed for ‘the most part’ means for more than half, and that such financing may include payments from users which are imposed, calculated and collected in accordance with rules of public law.

The determination should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in which the expressed or presumed intentions of the contracting authority to regard the various aspects making up a mixed contract as indivisible should not be sufficient, but should be supported by objective evidence capable of justifying them and of establishing the need to conclude a single contract. Such a justified need to conclude a single contract could for instance be present in the case of the construction of one single building, a part of which is to be used directly by the contracting authority concerned and another part to be operated on a concessions basis, for instance to provide parking facilities to the public. It should be clarified that the need to conclude a single contract may be due to reasons both of a technical nature and of an economic nature.

In the case of mixed contracts which can be separated, contracting authorities are always free to award separate contracts for the separate parts of the mixed contract, in which case the provisions applicable to each separate part should be determined exclusively with respect to the characteristics of that specific contract. On the other hand, where contracting authorities choose to include other elements in the procurement, whatever their value and whatever the legal regime the added elements would otherwise have been subject to, the main principle should be that, where a contract should be awarded pursuant to the provisions of this Directive, if awarded on its own, then this Directive should continue to apply to the entire mixed contract.

It should be clarified that the notion of ‘economic operators’ should be interpreted in a broad manner so as to include any persons and/or entities which offer the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market, irrespective of the legal form under which they have chosen to operate. Thus, firms, branches, subsidiaries, partnerships, cooperative societies, limited companies, universities, public or private, and other forms of entities than natural persons should all fall within the notion of economic operator, whether or not they are ‘legal persons’ in all circumstances.

It should also be clarified that contracting authorities should be able to set out explicitly how groups of economic operators are to meet the requirements concerning economic and financial standing as set out in this Directive, or the criteria relating to technical and professional ability, which are required of economic operators participating on their own.

The performance of contracts by groups of economic operators may necessitate setting conditions which are not imposed on individual participants. Such conditions, which should be justified by objective reasons and be proportionate, could for instance include requiring the appointment of a joint representation or a lead partner for the purposes of the procurement procedure or requiring information on their constitution.

Contracting authorities should make use of all possible means at their disposal under national law in order to prevent distortions in public procurement procedures stemming from conflicts of interest. This could include procedures to identify, prevent and remedy conflicts of interests.

The GPA applies to contracts above certain thresholds, set in the GPA and expressed as special drawing rights. The thresholds laid down by this Directive should be aligned to ensure that they correspond to the euro equivalents of the thresholds of the GPA. Provision should also be made for periodic reviews of the thresholds expressed in euros so as to adjust them, by means of a purely mathematical operation, to possible variations in the value of the euro in relation to those special drawing rights. Apart from those periodic mathematical adjustments, an increase in the thresholds set in the GPA should be explored during the next round of negotiations thereof.

It should be clarified that, for the estimation of the value of a contract, all revenues have to be taken into account, whether received from the contracting authority or from third parties. It should also be clarified that, for the purpose of estimating the thresholds, the notion of similar supplies should be understood as products which are intended for identical or similar uses, such as supplies of a range of foods or of various items of office furniture. Typically, an economic operator active in the field concerned would be likely to carry such supplies as part of his normal product range.

For the purposes of estimating the value of a given procurement, it should be clarified that it should be allowed to base the estimation of the value on a subdivision of the procurement only where justified by objective reasons. For instance, it could be justified to estimate contract values at the level of a separate operational unit of the contracting authority, such as for instance schools or kindergartens, provided that the unit in question is independently responsible for its procurement. This can be assumed where the separate operational unit independently runs the procurement procedures and makes the buying decisions, has a separate budget line at its disposal for the procurements concerned, concludes the contract independently and finances it from a budget which it has at its disposal. A subdivision is not justified where the contracting authority merely organises a procurement in a decentralised way.

Being addressed to Member States, this Directive does not apply to procurement carried out by international organisations on their own behalf and for their own account. There is, however, a need to clarify to what extent this Directive should be applied to procurement governed by specific international rules.

The awarding of public contracts for certain audiovisual and radio media services by media providers should allow aspects of cultural or social significance to be taken into account, which renders the application of procurement rules inappropriate. For those reasons, an exception should therefore be made for public service contracts, awarded by the media service providers themselves, for the purchase, development, production or co-production of off-the-shelf programmes and other preparatory services, such as those relating to scripts or artistic performances necessary for the production of the programme. It should also be clarified that that exclusion should apply equally to broadcast media services and on-demand services (non-linear services). However, that exclusion should not apply to the supply of technical equipment necessary for the production, co-production and broadcasting of such programmes.

It should be recalled that arbitration and conciliation services and other similar forms of alternative dispute resolution are usually provided by bodies or individuals which are agreed on, or selected, in a manner which cannot be governed by procurement rules. It should be clarified that this Directive does not apply to service contracts for the provision of such services, whatever their denomination under national law.

A certain number of legal services are rendered by service providers that are designated by a court or tribunal of a Member State, involve representation of clients in judicial proceedings by lawyers, must be provided by notaries or are connected with the exercise of official authority. Such legal services are usually provided by bodies or individuals designated or selected in a manner which cannot be governed by procurement rules, such as for instance the designation of State Attorneys in certain Member States. Those legal services should therefore be excluded from the scope of this Directive.

It is appropriate to specify that the notion of financial instruments as referred to in this Directive is given the same meaning as in other internal market legislation and, in view of the recent creation of the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism, it should be stipulated that operations conducted with that Facility and that Mechanism should be excluded from the scope of this Directive. It should finally be clarified that loans, whether or not they are in connection with the issuing of securities or other financial instruments or other operations therewith, should be excluded from the scope of this Directive.

This Directive should not apply to certain emergency services where they are performed by non-profit organisations or associations, since the particular nature of those organisations would be difficult to preserve if the service providers had to be chosen in accordance with the procedures set out in this Directive. However, the exclusion should not be extended beyond that strictly necessary. It should therefore be set out explicitly that patient transport ambulance services should not be excluded. In that context it is furthermore necessary to clarify that CPV Group 601 ‘Land Transport Services’ does not cover ambulance services, to be found in CPV class 8514. It should therefore be clarified that services, which are covered by CPV code 85143000-3, consisting exclusively of patient transport ambulance services should be subject to the special regime set out for social and other specific services (the ‘light regime’). Consequently, mixed contracts for the provision of ambulance services in general would also be subject to the light regime if the value of the patient transport ambulance services were greater than the value of other ambulance services.

However, certain services (such as propaganda film and video-tape production) are so inextricably connected to the political views of the service provider when provided in the context of an election campaign, that the service providers are normally selected in a manner which cannot be governed by procurement rules.

Finally, it should be recalled that the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations are subject to rules other than those laid down in this Directive.

In certain cases, a contracting authority or an association of contracting authorities may be the sole source for a particular service, in respect of the provision of which it enjoys an exclusive right pursuant to laws, regulations or published administrative provisions which are compatible with the TFEU. It should be clarified that this Directive need not apply to the award of public service contracts to that contracting authority or association.

Such clarification should be guided by the principles set out in the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The sole fact that both parties to an agreement are themselves public authorities does not as such rule out the application of procurement rules. However, the application of public procurement rules should not interfere with the freedom of public authorities to perform the public service tasks conferred on them by using their own resources, which includes the possibility of cooperation with other public authorities.

It should be ensured that any exempted public-public cooperation does not result in a distortion of competition in relation to private economic operators in so far as it places a private provider of services in a position of advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.

The exemption should not extend to situations where there is direct participation by a private economic operator in the capital of the controlled legal person since, in such circumstances, the award of a public contract without a competitive procedure would provide the private economic operator with a capital participation in the controlled legal person an undue advantage over its competitors. However, in view of the particular characteristics of public bodies with compulsory membership, such as organisations responsible for the management or exercise of certain public services, this should not apply in cases where the participation of specific private economic operators in the capital of the controlled legal person is made compulsory by a national legislative provision in conformity with the Treaties, provided that such participation is non-controlling and non-blocking and does not confer a decisive influence on the decisions of the controlled legal person. It should further be clarified that the decisive element is only the direct private participation in the controlled legal person. Therefore, where there is private capital participation in the controlling contracting authority or in the controlling contracting authorities, this does not preclude the award of public contracts to the controlled legal person, without applying the procedures provided for by this Directive as such participations do not adversely affect competition between private economic operators.

It should also be clarified that contracting authorities such as bodies governed by public law, that may have private capital participation, should be in a position to avail themselves of the exemption for horizontal cooperation. Consequently, where all other conditions in relation to horizontal cooperation are met, the horizontal cooperation exemption should extend to such contracting authorities where the contract is concluded exclusively between contracting authorities.

Contracts for the joint provision of public services should not be subject to the application of the rules set out in this Directive provided that they are concluded exclusively between contracting authorities, that the implementation of that cooperation is governed solely by considerations relating to the public interest and that no private service provider is placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.

In order to fulfil those conditions, the cooperation should be based on a cooperative concept. Such cooperation does not require all participating authorities to assume the performance of main contractual obligations, as long as there are commitments to contribute towards the cooperative performance of the public service in question. In addition, the implementation of the cooperation, including any financial transfers between the participating contracting authorities, should be governed solely by considerations relating to the public interest.

Certain cases exist where a legal entity acts, under the relevant provisions of national law, as an instrument or technical service to determined contracting authorities, is obliged to carry out orders given to it by those contracting authorities and has no influence on the remuneration for its performance. In view of its non-contractual nature, such a purely administrative relationship should not fall within the scope of public procurement procedures.

The co-financing of research and development (R&D) programmes by industry sources should be encouraged. It should consequently be clarified that this Directive applies only where there is no such co-financing and where the outcome of the R&D activities go to the contracting authority concerned. This should not exclude the possibility that the service provider, having carried out those activities, could publish an account thereof as long as the contracting authority retains the exclusive right to use the outcome of the R&D in the conduct of its own affairs. However fictitious sharing of the results of the R&D or purely symbolic participation in the remuneration of the service provider should not prevent the application of this Directive.

Employment and occupation contribute to integration in society and are key elements in guaranteeing equal opportunities for all. In this context, sheltered workshops can play a significant role. The same is true for other social businesses whose main aim is to support the social and professional integration or reintegration of disabled and disadvantaged persons, such as the unemployed, members of disadvantaged minorities or otherwise socially marginalised groups. However, such workshops or businesses might not be able to obtain contracts under normal conditions of competition. Consequently, it is appropriate to provide that Member States should be able to reserve the right to participate in award procedures for public contracts or for certain lots thereof to such workshops or businesses or reserve performance of contracts to the context of sheltered employment programmes.

Services should be considered to be provided at the place at which the characteristic performances are executed. When services are provided at a distance, for example services provided by call centres, those services should be considered to be provided at the place where the services are executed, irrespective of the places and Member States to which the services are directed.

The relevant obligations could be mirrored in contract clauses. It should also be possible to include clauses ensuring compliance with collective agreements in compliance with Union law in public contracts. Non-compliance with the relevant obligations could be considered to be grave misconduct on the part of the economic operator concerned, liable to exclusion of that economic operator from the procedure for the award of a public contract.

Control of the observance of the environmental, social and labour law provisions should be performed at the relevant stages of the procurement procedure, when applying the general principles governing the choice of participants and the award of contracts, when applying the exclusion criteria and when applying the provisions concerning abnormally low tenders. The necessary verification for that purpose should be carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Directive, in particular those governing means of proof and self-declarations.

Nothing in this Directive should prevent the imposition or enforcement of measures necessary to protect public policy, public morality, public security, health, human and animal life, the preservation of plant life or other environmental measures, in particular with a view to sustainable development, provided that those measures are in conformity with the TFEU.

There is a great need for contracting authorities to have additional flexibility to choose a procurement procedure, which provides for negotiations. A greater use of those procedures is also likely to increase cross-border trade, as the evaluation has shown that contracts awarded by negotiated procedure with prior publication have a particularly high success rate of cross-border tenders. Member States should be able to provide for the use of the competitive procedure with negotiation or the competitive dialogue, in various situations where open or restricted procedures without negotiations are not likely to lead to satisfactory procurement outcomes. It should be recalled that use of the competitive dialogue has significantly increased in terms of contract values over the past years. It has shown itself to be of use in cases where contracting authorities are unable to define the means of satisfying their needs or of assessing what the market can offer in terms of technical, financial or legal solutions. This situation may arise in particular with innovative projects, the implementation of major integrated transport infrastructure projects, large computer networks or projects involving complex and structured financing. Where relevant, contracting authorities should be encouraged to appoint a project leader to ensure good cooperation between the economic operators and the contracting authority during the award procedure.

For works contracts, such situations include works that are not standard buildings or where works includes design or innovative solutions. For services or supplies that require adaptation or design efforts, the use of a competitive procedure with negotiation or competitive dialogue is likely to be of value. Such adaptation or design efforts are particularly necessary in the case of complex purchases such as sophisticated products, intellectual services, for example some consultancy services, architectural services or engineering services, or major information and communications technology (ICT) projects. In those cases, negotiations may be necessary to guarantee that the supply or service in question corresponds to the needs of the contracting authority. In respect of off-the-shelf services or supplies that can be provided by many different operators on the market, the competitive procedure with negotiation and competitive dialogue should not be used.

The competitive procedure with negotiation should also be available in cases where an open or restricted procedure resulted only in irregular or unacceptable tenders. In such cases, contracting authorities should be allowed to conduct negotiations with the aim of obtaining regular and acceptable tenders.

It should be clarified that the minimum requirements to be set by the contracting authority are those conditions and characteristics (particularly physical, functional and legal) that any tender should meet or possess in order to allow the contracting authority to award the contract in accordance with the chosen award criteria. In order to ensure transparency and traceability of the process, all stages should be duly documented. Furthermore, all tenders throughout the procedure should be submitted in writing.

Contracting authorities should be allowed to shorten certain deadlines applicable to open and restricted procedures and to competitive procedures with negotiation where the deadlines in question would be impracticable because of a state of urgency which should be duly substantiated by the contracting authorities. It should be clarified that this need not be an extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable for and not attributable to the contracting authority.

It should be recalled that a series of procurement models have been outlined in the Commission Communication of 14 December 2007 entitled ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’, which deals with the procurement of those R&D services not falling within the scope of this Directive. Those models would continue to be available, but this Directive should also contribute to facilitating public procurement of innovation and help Member States in achieving the Innovation Union targets.

Because of the importance of innovation, contracting authorities should be encouraged to allow variants as often as possible. The attention of those authorities should consequently be drawn to the need to define the minimum requirements to be met by variants before indicating that variants may be submitted.

Contracting authorities should therefore not use innovation partnerships in such a way as to prevent, restrict or distort competition. In certain cases, setting up innovation partnerships with several partners could contribute to avoiding such effects.

Contracting authorities relying on this exception should provide reasons why there are no reasonable alternatives or substitutes such as using alternative distribution channels including outside the Member State of the contracting authority or considering functionally comparable works, supplies and services.

Where the situation of exclusivity is due to technical reasons, they should be rigorously defined and justified on a case-by-case basis. They could include, for instance, near technical impossibility for another economic operator to achieve the required performance or the necessity to use specific know-how, tools or means which only one economic operator has at its disposal. Technical reasons may also derive from specific interoperability requirements which must be fulfilled in order to ensure the functioning of the works, supplies or services to be procured.

Finally, a procurement procedure is not useful where supplies are purchased directly on a commodity market, including trading platforms for commodities such as agricultural products, raw materials and energy exchanges, where the regulated and supervised multilateral trading structure naturally guarantees market prices.

It should be clarified that the provisions concerning protection of confidential information do not in any way prevent public disclosure of non-confidential parts of concluded contracts, including any subsequent changes.

Electronic means of information and communication can greatly simplify the publication of contracts and increase the efficiency and transparency of procurement processes. They should become the standard means of communication and information exchange in procurement procedures, as they greatly enhance the possibilities of economic operators to participate in procurement procedures across the internal market. For that purpose, transmission of notices in electronic form, electronic availability of the procurement documents and – after a transition period of 30 months – fully electronic communication, meaning communication by electronic means at all stages of the procedure, including the transmission of requests for participation and, in particular, the transmission of the tenders (electronic submission) should be made mandatory. Member States and contracting authorities should remain free to go further if they so wish. It should also be clarified that mandatory use of electronic means of communications pursuant to this Directive should not, however, oblige contracting authorities to carry out electronic processing of tenders, nor should it mandate electronic evaluation or automatic processing. Furthermore, pursuant to this Directive, no elements of the public procurement process after the award of the contract should be covered by the obligation to use electronic means of communication, nor should internal communication within the contracting authority.

It should however be clarified that the use of other means of communication should be limited to those elements of the tender for which electronic means of communications are not required.

It is appropriate to clarify that, where necessary for technical reasons, contracting authorities should be able to set a maximum limit to the size of the files that may be submitted.

There can be exceptional cases in which contracting authorities should be allowed not to use electronic means of communication where not using such means of communication is necessary in order to protect the particularly sensitive nature of information. It should be clarified that, where the use of electronic tools which are not generally available can offer the necessary level of protection, such electronic tools should be used. Such might for instance be the case where contracting authorities require the use of dedicated secure means of communication to which they offer access.

Differing technical formats or processes and messaging standards could potentially create obstacles to interoperability, not only within each Member State but also and especially between the Member States. For example, in order to participate in a procurement procedure in which use of electronic catalogues, which is a format for the presentation and organisation of information in a manner that is common to all the participating bidders and which lends itself to electronic treatment, is permitted or required, economic operators would, in the absence of standardisation, be required to customise their own catalogues to each procurement procedure, which would entail providing very similar information in different formats depending on the specifications of the contracting authority concerned. Standardising the catalogue formats would thus improve the level of interoperability, enhance efficiency and would also reduce the effort required of economic operators.

Before specifying the level of security required for the electronic means of communications to be used at the various stages of the award procedure, Member States and contracting authorities should evaluate the proportionality between on the one hand the requirements aimed at ensuring correct and reliable identification of the senders of the communication concerned as well as the integrity of its content, and on the other hand the risk of problems such as in situations where messages are sent by a different sender than that indicated. All other things being equal, this would mean that the level of security required of, for instance, an email requesting confirmation of the exact address at which an information meeting will be held would not need to be set at the same level as for the tender itself which constitutes a binding offer for the economic operator. Similarly, the evaluation of proportionality could result in lower levels of security being required in connection with the resubmission of electronic catalogues or the submission of tenders in the context of mini-competitions under a framework agreement or the access to procurement documents.

While essential elements of a procurement procedure such as the procurement documents, requests for participation, confirmation of interest and tenders should always be made in writing, oral communication with economic operators should otherwise continue to be possible, provided that its content is documented to a sufficient degree. This is necessary to ensure an adequate level of transparency that allows for a verification of whether the principle of equal treatment has been adhered to. In particular, it is essential that oral communications with tenderers which could have an impact on the content and assessment of the tenders be documented to a sufficient extent and by appropriate means, such as written or audio records or summaries of the main elements of the communication.

There is a strong trend emerging across Union public procurement markets towards the aggregation of demand by public purchasers, with a view to obtaining economies of scale, including lower prices and transaction costs, and to improving and professionalising procurement management. This can be achieved by concentrating purchases either by the number of contracting authorities involved or by volume and value over time. However, the aggregation and centralisation of purchases should be carefully monitored in order to avoid excessive concentration of purchasing power and collusion, and to preserve transparency and competition, as well as market access opportunities for SMEs.

The instrument of framework agreements has been widely used and is considered as an efficient procurement technique throughout Europe. It should therefore be maintained largely as it is. However, certain aspects need to be clarified, in particular that framework agreements should not be used by contracting authorities which are not identified in them. For that purpose, the contracting authorities that are parties to a specific framework agreement from the outset should be clearly indicated, either by name or by other means, such as a reference to a given category of contracting authorities within a clearly delimited geographical area, so that the contracting authorities concerned can be easily and unequivocally identified. Likewise, a framework agreement should not be open to entry of new economic operators once it has been concluded. This implies for instance that where a central purchasing body uses an overall register of the contracting authorities or categories thereof, such as the local authorities in a given geographical area, that are entitled to have recourse to framework agreements it concludes, that central purchasing body should do so in a way that makes it possible to verify not only the identity of the contracting authority concerned but also the date from which it acquires the right to have recourse to the framework agreement concluded by the central purchasing body as that date determines which specific framework agreements that contracting authority should be allowed to use.

Contracting authorities should be given additional flexibility when procuring under framework agreements, which are concluded with more than one economic operator and which set out all the terms.

In such cases, contracting authorities should be allowed to obtain specific works, supplies or services, that are covered by the framework agreement, either by requiring them from one of the economic operators, determined in accordance with objective criteria and on the terms already set out, or by awarding a specific contract for the works, supplies or services concerned following a mini-competition among the economic operators parties to the framework agreement. To ensure transparency and equal treatment, contracting authorities should indicate in the procurement documents for the framework agreement the objective criteria that will govern the choice between those two methods of performing the framework agreement. Such criteria could for instance relate to the quantity, value or characteristics of the works, supplies or services concerned, including the need for a higher degree of service or an increased security level, or to developments in price levels compared to a predetermined price index. Framework agreements should not be used improperly or in such a way as to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Contracting authorities should not be obliged pursuant to this Directive to procure works, supplies or services that are covered by a framework agreement, under that framework agreement.

It should also be clarified that there might be exceptional cases in which the length of the framework agreements themselves should be allowed to be longer than four years. Such cases, which should be duly justified, in particular by the subject of the framework agreement, might for instance arise where economic operators need to dispose of equipment the amortisation period of which is longer than four years and which must be available at any time over the entire duration of the framework agreement.

In view of the experience acquired, there is also a need to adjust the rules governing dynamic purchasing systems to enable contracting authorities to take full advantage of the possibilities afforded by that instrument. The systems need to be simplified; in particular they should be operated in the form of a restricted procedure, hence eliminating the need for indicative tenders, which have been identified as one of the major burdens associated with dynamic purchasing systems. Thus any economic operator that submits a request to participate and meets the selection criteria should be allowed to take part in procurement procedures carried out through the dynamic purchasing system over its period of validity. This purchasing technique allows the contracting authority to have a particularly broad range of tenders and hence to ensure optimum use of public funds through broad competition in respect of commonly used or off-the-shelf products, works or services which are generally available on the market.

The examination of those requests to participate should normally be performed within a maximum of 10 working days, given that the evaluation of the selection criteria will take place on the basis of the simplified requirements for documentation that are set out in this Directive. However, when a dynamic purchasing system is first set up, contracting authorities might, in response to the first publication of the contract notice or the invitation to confirm interest, be faced with such a large number of requests for participation that they would need more time to examine the requests. That should be admissible, provided that no specific procurement is launched before all the requests have been examined. Contracting authorities should be free to organise the way in which they intend to examine the requests for participation, for instance by deciding to conduct such examinations only once a week, provided the deadlines for the examination of each request of admission are observed.

At any time during the period of validity of the dynamic purchasing system, contracting authorities should be free to require economic operators to submit a renewed and updated self-declaration on the fulfilment of criteria for qualitative selection, within an adequate time limit. It should be recalled that the possibility foreseen in the general provisions on means of proof of this Directive to ask economic operators to submit supporting documents and the obligation to do so of the tenderer to which it has decided to award the contract also apply in the particular context of dynamic purchasing systems.

In order to further the possibilities of SMEs to participate in a large-scale dynamic purchasing system, for instance one that is operated by a central purchasing body, the contracting authority concerned should be able to articulate the system in objectively defined categories of products, works or services. Such categories should be defined by reference to objective factors which might for instance include the maximum allowable size of specific contracts to be awarded within the category concerned or a specific geographic area in which specific contracts are to be performed. Where a dynamic purchasing system is divided into categories, the contracting authority should apply selection criteria that are proportionate to the characteristics of the category concerned.

It should, however, also be clarified that electronic auctions may be used in a procurement procedure for the purchase of a specific intellectual property right. It is also appropriate to recall that while contracting authorities remain free to reduce the number of candidates or tenderers as long as the auction has not yet started, no further reduction of the number of tenderers participating in the electronic auction should be allowed after the auction has started.

Furthermore, where sufficient guarantees are offered in respect of ensuring traceability, equal treatment and predictability, contracting authorities should be allowed to generate tenders in relation to specific purchases on the basis of previously transmitted electronic catalogues, in particular where competition has been reopened under a framework agreement or where a dynamic purchasing system is being used.

Where tenders have been generated by the contracting authority, the economic operator concerned should be given the possibility to verify that the tender thus constituted by the contracting authority does not contain any material errors. Where material errors are present, the economic operator should not be bound by the tender generated by the contracting authority unless the error is corrected.

In line with the requirements of the rules for electronic means of communication, contracting authorities should avoid unjustified obstacles to economic operators’ access to procurement procedures in which tenders are to be presented in the form of electronic catalogues and which guarantee compliance with the general principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment.

Firstly, they should be able to act as wholesalers by buying, stocking and reselling or, secondly, they should be able to act as intermediaries by awarding contracts, operating dynamic purchasing systems or concluding framework agreements to be used by contracting authorities. Such an intermediary role might in some cases be carried out by conducting the relevant award procedures autonomously, without detailed instructions from the contracting authorities concerned; in other cases, by conducting the relevant award procedures under the instructions of the contracting authorities concerned, on their behalf and for their account.

Furthermore, rules should be laid down for allocating responsibility for the observance of the obligations pursuant to this Directive, as between the central purchasing body and the contracting authorities procuring from or through it. Where the central purchasing body has sole responsibility for the conduct of the procurement procedures, it should also be solely and directly responsible for the legality of the procedures. Where a contracting authority conducts certain parts of the procedure, for instance the reopening of competition under a framework agreement or the award of individual contracts based on a dynamic purchasing system, it should continue to be responsible for the stages it conducts.

Contracting authorities should be allowed to award a public service contract for the provision of centralised purchasing activities to a central purchasing body without applying the procedures provided for in this Directive. It should also be permitted for such public service contracts to include the provision of ancillary purchasing activities. Public service contracts for the provision of ancillary purchasing activities should, when performed otherwise than by a central purchasing body in connection with its provision of central purchasing activities to the contracting authority concerned, be awarded in accordance with this Directive. It should also be recalled that this Directive should not apply where centralised or ancillary purchasing activities are provided other than through a contract for pecuniary interest which constitutes procurement within the meaning of this Directive.

Joint procurement can take many different forms, ranging from coordinated procurement through the preparation of common technical specifications for works, supplies or services that will be procured by a number of contracting authorities, each conducting a separate procurement procedure, to situations where the contracting authorities concerned jointly conduct one procurement procedure either by acting together or by entrusting one contracting authority with the management of the procurement procedure on behalf of all contracting authorities.

Where several contracting authorities are jointly conducting a procurement procedure, they should be jointly responsible for fulfilling their obligations under this Directive. However, where only parts of the procurement procedure are jointly conducted by the contracting authorities, joint responsibility should apply only to those parts of the procedure that have been carried out together. Each contracting authority should be solely responsible in respect of procedures or parts of procedures it conducts on its own, such as the awarding of a contract, the conclusion of a framework agreement, the operation of a dynamic purchasing system, the reopening of competition under a framework agreement or the determination of which of the economic operators party to a framework agreement shall perform a given task.

Electronic means of communication are particularly well suited to supporting centralised purchasing practices and tools because of the possibility they offer to re-use and automatically process data and to minimise information and transaction costs. The use of such electronic means of communication should therefore, as a first step, be rendered compulsory for central purchasing bodies, while also facilitating converging practices across the Union. This should be followed by a general obligation to use electronic means of communication in all procurement procedures after a transition period of 30 months.

However, contracting authorities should not make use of the possibilities for cross-border joint procurement for the purpose of circumventing mandatory public law rules, in conformity with Union law, which are applicable to them in the Member State where they are located. Such rules might include, for example, provisions on transparency and access to documents or specific requirements for the traceability of sensitive supplies.

Consequently, technical specifications should be drafted in such a way as to avoid artificially narrowing down competition through requirements that favour a specific economic operator by mirroring key characteristics of the supplies, services or works habitually offered by that economic operator. Drawing up the technical specifications in terms of functional and performance requirements generally allows that objective to be achieved in the best way possible. Functional and performance-related requirements are also appropriate means to favour innovation in public procurement and should be used as widely as possible. Where reference is made to a European standard or, in the absence thereof, to a national standard, tenders based on equivalent arrangements should be considered by contracting authorities. It should be the responsibility of the economic operator to prove equivalence with the requested label.

To prove equivalence, it should be possible to require tenderers to provide third-party verified evidence. However, other appropriate means of proof such as a technical dossier of the manufacturer should also be allowed where the economic operator concerned has no access to such certificates or test reports, or no possibility of obtaining them within the relevant time limits, provided that the economic operator concerned thereby proves that the works, supplies or services meet the requirements or criteria set out in the technical specifications, the award criteria or the contract performance conditions.

It should equally be clarified that specific national or government bodies or organisations can be involved in setting up label requirements that may be used in connection with procurement by public authorities without those bodies or organisations losing their status as third parties.

References to labels should not have the effect of restricting innovation.

For all procurement intended for use by persons, whether general public or staff of the contracting authority, it is necessary for contracting authorities to lay down technical specifications so as to take into account accessibility criteria for people with disabilities or design for all users, except in duly justified cases.

When drawing up technical specifications, contracting authorities should take into account requirements ensuing from Union law in the field of data protection law, in particular in relation to the design of the processing of personal data (data protection by design).

The size and subject-matter of the lots should be determined freely by the contracting authority, which, in accordance with the relevant rules on the calculation of the estimated value of procurement, should also be allowed to award some of the lots without applying the procedures of this Directive. The contracting authority should have a duty to consider the appropriateness of dividing contracts into lots while remaining free to decide autonomously on the basis of any reason it deems relevant, without being subject to administrative or judicial supervision. Where the contracting authority decides that it would not be appropriate to divide the contract into lots, the individual report or the procurement documents should contain an indication of the main reasons for the contracting authority’s choice. Such reasons could for instance be that the contracting authority finds that such division could risk restricting competition, or risk rendering the execution of the contract excessively technically difficult or expensive, or that the need to coordinate the different contractors for the lots could seriously risk undermining the proper execution of the contract.

Member States should remain free to go further in their efforts to facilitate the involvement of SMEs in the public procurement market, by extending the scope of the obligation to consider the appropriateness of dividing contracts into lots to smaller contracts, by requiring contracting authorities to provide a justification for a decision not to divide contracts into lots or by rendering a division into lots obligatory under certain conditions. With the same purpose, Member States should also be free to provide mechanisms for direct payments to subcontractors.

However, the objective of facilitating greater access to public procurement by SMEs might be hampered if contracting authorities would be obliged to award the contract lot by lot even where this would entail having to accept substantially less advantageous solutions compared to an award grouping several or all of the lots. Where the possibility to apply such a method has been clearly indicated beforehand, it should therefore be possible for contracting authorities to conduct a comparative assessment of the tenders in order to establish whether the tenders submitted by a particular tenderer for a specific combination of lots would, taken as whole, fulfil the award criteria laid down in accordance with this Directive with regard to those lots better than the tenders for the individual lots concerned seen in isolation. If so, the contracting authority should be allowed to award a contract combining the lots in question to the tenderer concerned. It should be clarified that contracting authorities should conduct such a comparative assessment by first determining which tenders best fulfil the award criteria laid down for each individual lot and then comparing it with the tenders submitted by a particular tenderer for a specific combination of lots, taken as a whole.

In order to make procedures faster and more efficient, time limits for participation in procurement procedures should be kept as short as possible without creating undue barriers to access for economic operators from across the internal market and in particular SMEs. It should therefore be kept in mind that, when fixing the time limits for the receipt of tenders and requests to participate, contracting authorities should take account in particular of the complexity of the contract and the time required to draw up tenders, even if this entails setting time limits that are longer than the minima provided for under this Directive. The use of electronic means of information and communication, in particular full electronic availability to economic operators, tenderers and candidates of procurement documents and electronic transmission of communications leads, on the other hand, to increased transparency and time savings. Therefore, provision should be made for reducing the minimum time limits in line with the rules set by the GPA and subject to the condition that they are compatible with the specific mode of transmission envisaged at Union level. Furthermore, contracting authorities should have the opportunity to further shorten the time limits for receipt of requests to participate and of tenders in cases where a state of urgency renders the regular time limits impracticable, but does not make a regular procedure with publication impossible. Only in exceptional situations where extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting authority concerned that are not attributable to that contracting authority makes it impossible to conduct a regular procedure even with shortened time limits, contracting authorities should, in so far as strictly necessary, have the possibility to award contracts by negotiated procedure without prior publication. This might be case where natural catastrophes require immediate action.

It should be clarified that the need to ensure that economic operators have sufficient time in which to draw up responsive tenders may entail that the time limits which were set initially may have to be extended. This would, in particular, be the case where significant changes are made to the procurement documents. It should also be specified that, in that case, significant changes should be understood as covering changes, in particular to the technical specifications, in respect of which economic operators would need additional time in order to understand and respond appropriately. It should, however, be clarified that such changes should not be so substantial that the admission of candidates other than those initially selected would have been allowed for or additional participants in the procurement procedure would have been attracted. That could, in particular, be the case where the changes render the contract or the framework agreement materially different in character from the one initially set out in the procurement documents.

In such duly justified cases contracting authorities should remain free to decide autonomously whether higher minimum turnover requirements would be appropriate and pertinent without being subject to administrative or judicial supervision. Where higher minimum turnover requirements are to be applied, contracting authorities should remain free to set the level as long as it is related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract. Where the contracting authority decides that the minimum turnover requirement should be set at a level higher than twice the estimated contract value, the individual report or the procurement documents should contain an indication of the main reasons for the contracting authority’s choice.

Contracting authorities should also be able to request information on the ratios, for instance, between assets and liabilities in the annual accounts. A positive ratio showing higher levels of assets than of liabilities could provide additional evidence that the financial capacity of economic operators is sufficient.

The tenderer to which it has been decided to award the contract should, however, be required to provide the relevant evidence and contracting authorities should not conclude contracts with tenderers unable to do so. Contracting authorities should also be entitled to request all or part of the supporting documents at any moment where they consider this to be necessary in view of the proper conduct of the procedure. This might in particular be the case in two-stage procedures – restricted procedures, competitive procedures with negotiation, competitive dialogues and innovation partnerships - in which the contracting authorities make use of the possibility to limit the number of candidates invited to submit a tender. Requiring submission of the supporting documents at the moment of selection of the candidates to be invited could be justified to avoid that contracting authorities invite candidates which later prove unable to submit the supporting documents at the award stage, depriving otherwise qualified candidates from participation.

It should be set out explicitly that the ESPD should also provide the relevant information in respect of entities on whose capacities an economic operator relies, so that the verification of the information regarding such entities can be carried out together with and on the same conditions as the verification in respect of the main economic operator.

It should also be provided that contracting authorities should not ask for still up-to-date documents, which they already possess from earlier procurement procedures. However, it should also be ensured that contracting authorities will not be faced with disproportionate archiving and filing burdens in this context. Consequently, implementation of this duty should only be applicable once the use of electronic means of communication is obligatory, as electronic document management will render the task much easier for contracting authorities.

Further simplification for both economic operators and contracting authorities could be obtained by means of a standard form for self-declarations, which could reduce problems linked to the precise drafting of formal statements and declarations of consent as well as language issues.

The Commission provides and manages an electronic system, e-Certis, which is currently updated and verified on a voluntary basis by national authorities. The aim of e-Certis is to facilitate the exchange of certificates and other documentary evidence frequently required by contracting authorities. Experience acquired so far indicates that voluntary updating and verification is insufficient to ensure that e-Certis can deliver its full potential for simplifying and facilitating documentary exchanges for the benefit of SMEs in particular. Maintenance should therefore be rendered obligatory in a first step. Recourse to e-Certis will be made mandatory at a later stage.

The notion of award criteria is central to this Directive. It is therefore important that the relevant provisions be presented in as simple and streamlined a way as possible. This can be obtained by using the terminology ‘most economically advantageous tender’ as the overriding concept, since all winning tenders should finally be chosen in accordance with what the individual contracting authority considers to be the economically best solution among those offered. In order to avoid confusion with the award criterion that is currently known as the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ in Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, a different terminology should be used to cover that concept, the ‘best price-quality ratio’. Consequently, it should be interpreted in accordance with the case-law relating to those Directives, except where there is a clearly materially different solution in this Directive.

In order to encourage a greater quality orientation of public procurement, Member States should be permitted to prohibit or restrict use of price only or cost only to assess the most economically advantageous tender where they deem this appropriate.

To ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment in the award of contracts, contracting authorities should be obliged to create the necessary transparency to enable all tenderers to be reasonably informed of the criteria and arrangements which will be applied in the contract award decision. Contracting authorities should therefore be obliged to indicate the contract award criteria and the relative weighting given to each of those criteria. Contracting authorities should, however, be permitted to derogate from that obligation to indicate the weighting of the criteria in duly justified cases for which they must be able to give reasons, where the weighting cannot be established in advance, in particular because of the complexity of the contract. In such cases, they should indicate the criteria in decreasing order of importance.

Article 11 TFEU requires that environmental protection requirements be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. This Directive clarifies how the contracting authorities can contribute to the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, whilst ensuring that they can obtain the best value for money for their contracts.

The chosen award criteria should not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority and they should ensure the possibility of effective and fair competition and be accompanied by arrangements that allow the information provided by the tenderers to be effectively verified.

To identify the most economically advantageous tender, the contract award decision should not be based on non-cost criteria only. Qualitative criteria should therefore be accompanied by a cost criterion that could, at the choice of the contracting authority, be either the price or a cost-effectiveness approach such as life-cycle costing. However, the award criteria should not affect the application of national provisions determining the remuneration of certain services or setting out fixed prices for certain supplies.

Where national provisions determine the remuneration of certain services or set out fixed prices for certain supplies, it should be clarified that it remains possible to assess value for money on the basis of other factors than solely the price or remuneration. Depending on the service or product concerned, such factors could, for instance, include conditions of delivery and payment, aspects of after-sale service (e.g. the extent of advisory and replacement services) or environmental or social aspects (e.g. whether books were stamped on recycled paper or paper from sustainable timber, the cost imputed to environmental externalities or whether the social integration of disadvantaged persons or members of vulnerable groups amongst the persons assigned to performing the contract has been furthered). Given the numerous possibilities of evaluating value for money on the basis of substantive criteria, recourse to drawing of lots as the sole means of awarding the contract should be avoided.

Wherever the quality of the staff employed is relevant to the level of performance of the contract, contracting authorities should also be allowed to use as an award criterion the organisation, qualification and experience of the staff assigned to performing the contract in question, as this can affect the quality of contract performance and, as a result, the economic value of the tender. This might be the case, for example, in contracts for intellectual services such as consultancy or architectural services. Contracting authorities which make use of this possibility should ensure, by appropriate contractual means, that the staff assigned to contract performance effectively fulfil the specified quality standards and that such staff can only be replaced with the consent of the contracting authority which verifies that the replacement staff affords an equivalent level of quality.

It therefore appears appropriate to continue on that path, leaving it to sector-specific legislation to set mandatory objectives and targets in function of the particular policies and conditions prevailing in the relevant sector and to promote the development and use of European approaches to life-cycle costing as a further underpinning for the use of public procurement in support of sustainable growth.

This means internal costs, such as research to be carried out, development, production, transport, use, maintenance and end-of-life disposal costs but can also include costs imputed to environmental externalities, such as pollution caused by extraction of the raw materials used in the product or caused by the product itself or its manufacturing, provided they can be monetised and monitored. The methods which contracting authorities use for assessing costs imputed to environmental externalities should be established in advance in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and be accessible to all interested parties. Such methods can be established at national, regional or local level, but they should, to avoid distortions of competition through tailor-made methodologies, remain general in the sense that they should not be set up specifically for a particular public procurement procedure.

Common methodologies should be developed at Union level for the calculation of life-cycle costs for specific categories of supplies or services. Where such common methodologies are developed, their use should be made compulsory.

Furthermore, the feasibility of establishing a common methodology on social life cycle costing should be examined, taking into account existing methodologies such as the Guidelines for Social Life Cycle Assessment of Products adopted within the framework of the United Nations Environment Programme.

However, the condition of a link with the subject-matter of the contract excludes criteria and conditions relating to general corporate policy, which cannot be considered as a factor characterising the specific process of production or provision of the purchased works, supplies or services. Contracting authorities should hence not be allowed to require tenderers to have a certain corporate social or environmental responsibility policy in place.

Contract performance conditions might also be intended to favour the implementation of measures for the promotion of equality of women and men at work, the increased participation of women in the labour market and the reconciliation of work and private life, the protection of the environment or animal welfare and, to comply in substance with fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions, and to recruit more disadvantaged persons than are required under national legislation.

Measures aiming at the protection of health of the staff involved in the production process, the favouring of social integration of disadvantaged persons or members of vulnerable groups amongst the persons assigned to performing the contract or training in the skills needed for the contract in question can also be the subject of award criteria or contract performance conditions provided that they relate to the works, supplies or services to be provided under the contract. For instance, such criteria or conditions might refer, amongst other things, to the employment of long-term job-seekers, the implementation of training measures for the unemployed or young persons in the course of the performance of the contract to be awarded. In technical specifications contracting authorities can provide such social requirements which directly characterise the product or service in question, such as accessibility for persons with disabilities or design for all users.

Public contracts should not be awarded to economic operators that have participated in a criminal organisation or have been found guilty of corruption, fraud to the detriment of the Union’s financial interests, terrorist offences, money laundering or terrorist financing. The non-payment of taxes or social security contributions should also lead to mandatory exclusion at the level of the Union. Member States should, however, be able to provide for a derogation from those mandatory exclusions in exceptional situations where overriding requirements in the general interest make a contract award indispensable. This might, for example, be the case where urgently needed vaccines or emergency equipment can only be purchased from an economic operator to whom one of the mandatory grounds for exclusion otherwise applies.

Bearing in mind that the contracting authority will be responsible for the consequences of its possible erroneous decision, contracting authorities should also remain free to consider that there has been grave professional misconduct, where, before a final and binding decision on the presence of mandatory exclusion grounds has been rendered, they can demonstrate by any appropriate means that the economic operator has violated its obligations, including obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security contributions, unless otherwise provided by national law. They should also be able to exclude candidates or tenderers whose performance in earlier public contracts has shown major deficiencies with regard to substantive requirements, for instance failure to deliver or perform, significant shortcomings of the product or service delivered, making it unusable for the intended purpose, or misbehaviour that casts serious doubts as to the reliability of the economic operator. National law should provide for a maximum duration for such exclusions.

In applying facultative grounds for exclusion, contracting authorities should pay particular attention to the principle of proportionality. Minor irregularities should only in exceptional circumstances lead to the exclusion of an economic operator. However repeated cases of minor irregularities can give rise to doubts about the reliability of an economic operator which might justify its exclusion.

Allowance should, however, be made for the possibility that economic operators can adopt compliance measures aimed at remedying the consequences of any criminal offences or misconduct and at effectively preventing further occurrences of the misbehaviour. Those measures might consist in particular of personnel and organisational measures such as the severance of all links with persons or organisations involved in the misbehaviour, appropriate staff reorganisation measures, the implementation of reporting and control systems, the creation of an internal audit structure to monitor compliance and the adoption of internal liability and compensation rules. Where such measures offer sufficient guarantees, the economic operator in question should no longer be excluded on those grounds alone. Economic operators should have the possibility to request that compliance measures taken with a view to possible admission to the procurement procedure be examined. However, it should be left to Member States to determine the exact procedural and substantive conditions applicable in such cases. They should, in particular, be free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting authorities to carry out the relevant assessments or to entrust other authorities on a central or decentralised level with that task.

Tenders that appear abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services might be based on technically, economically or legally unsound assumptions or practices. Where the tenderer cannot provide a sufficient explanation, the contracting authority should be entitled to reject the tender. Rejection should be mandatory in cases where the contracting authority has established that the abnormally low price or costs proposed results from non-compliance with mandatory Union law or national law compatible with it in the fields of social, labour or environmental law or international labour law provisions.

The contract performance conditions should be indicated in the contract notice, the prior information notice used as a means of calling for competition or the procurement documents.

It is also necessary to ensure some transparency in the subcontracting chain, as this gives contracting authorities information on who is present at building sites on which works are being performed for them, or on which undertakings are providing services in or at buildings, infrastructures or areas, such as town halls, municipal schools, sports facilities, ports or motorways, for which the contracting authorities are responsible or over which they have a direct oversight. It should be clarified that the obligation to deliver the required information is in any case incumbent upon the main contractor, either on the basis of specific clauses, that each contracting authority would have to include in all procurement procedures, or on the basis of obligations which Member States would impose on main contractors by means of generally applicable provisions.

It should also be clarified that the conditions relating to the enforcement of observance of applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law, established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in this Directive, provided that such rules, and their application, comply with Union law, should be applied whenever the national law of a Member State provides for a mechanism of joint liability between subcontractors and the main contractor. Furthermore, it should be stated explicitly that Member States should be able to go further, for instance by extending the transparency obligations, by enabling direct payment to subcontractors or by enabling or requiring contracting authorities to verify that subcontractors are not in any of the situations in which exclusion of economic operators would be warranted. Where such measures are applied to subcontractors, coherence with the provisions applicable to main contractors should be ensured so that the existence of compulsory exclusion grounds would be followed by a requirement that the main contractor replace the subcontractor concerned. Where such verification shows the presence of non-compulsory grounds for exclusion, it should be clarified that contracting authorities are able to require the replacement. It should, however, also be set out explicitly that contracting authorities may be obliged to require the replacement of the subcontractor concerned where exclusion of main contractors would be obligatory in such cases.

It should also be set out explicitly that Member States remain free to provide for more stringent liability rules under national law or to go further under national law on direct payments to subcontractors.

Modifications to the contract resulting in a minor change of the contract value up to a certain value should always be possible without the need to carry out a new procurement procedure. To this effect and in order to ensure legal certainty, this Directive should provide for de minimis thresholds, below which a new procurement procedure is not necessary. Modifications to the contract above those thresholds should be possible without the need to carry out a new procurement procedure to the extent they comply with the relevant conditions laid down in this Directive.

Contracting authorities may be faced with situations where additional works, supplies or services become necessary; in such cases a modification of the initial contract without a new procurement procedure may be justified, in particular where the additional deliveries are intended either as a partial replacements or as the extension of existing services, supplies or installations where a change of supplier would oblige the contracting authority to acquire material, works or services having different technical characteristics which would result in incompatibility or disproportionate technical difficulties in operation and maintenance.

Contracting authorities can be faced with external circumstances that they could not foresee when they awarded the contract, in particular when the performance of the contract covers a long period. In this case, a certain degree of flexibility is needed to adapt the contract to those circumstances without a new procurement procedure. The notion of unforeseeable circumstances refers to circumstances that could not have been predicted despite reasonably diligent preparation of the initial award by the contracting authority, taking into account its available means, the nature and characteristics of the specific project, good practice in the field in question and the need to ensure an appropriate relationship between the resources spent in preparing the award and its foreseeable value. However, this cannot apply in cases where a modification results in an alteration of the nature of the overall procurement, for instance by replacing the works, supplies or services to be procured by something different or by fundamentally changing the type of procurement since, in such a situation, a hypothetical influence on the outcome may be assumed.

In line with the principles of equal treatment and transparency, the successful tenderer should not, for instance where a contract is terminated because of deficiencies in the performance, be replaced by another economic operator without reopening the contract to competition. However, the successful tenderer performing the contract should be able, in particular where the contract has been awarded to more than one undertaking, to undergo certain structural changes during the performance of the contract, such as purely internal reorganisations, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions or insolvency. Such structural changes should not automatically require new procurement procedures for all public contracts performed by that tenderer.

Contracting authorities should, in the individual contracts themselves, have the possibility to provide for modifications to a contract by way of review or option clauses, but such clauses should not give them unlimited discretion. This Directive should therefore set out to what extent modifications may be provided for in the initial contract. It should consequently be clarified that sufficiently clearly drafted review or option clauses may for instance provide for price indexations or ensure that, for example, communications equipment to be delivered over a given period continues to be suitable, also in the case of changing communications protocols or other technological changes. It should also be possible under sufficiently clear clauses to provide for adaptations of the contract which are rendered necessary by technical difficulties which have appeared during operation or maintenance. It should also be recalled that contracts could, for instance, include both ordinary maintenance as well as provide for extraordinary maintenance interventions that might become necessary in order to ensure continuation of a public service.

Contracting authorities are sometimes faced with circumstances that require the early termination of public contracts in order to comply with obligations under Union law in the field of public procurement. Member States should therefore ensure that contracting authorities have the possibility, under the conditions determined by national law, to terminate a public contract during its term if so required by Union law.

The results of the Commission staff working paper of 27 June 2011 entitled ‘Evaluation Report: Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation’ suggested that the exclusion of certain services from the full application of Directive 2004/18/EC should be reviewed. As a result, the full application of this Directive should be extended to a number of services.

Services to the person with values below that threshold will typically not be of interest to providers from other Member States, unless there are concrete indications to the contrary, such as Union financing for cross-border projects.

Contracts for services to the person above that threshold should be subject to Union-wide transparency. Given the importance of the cultural context and the sensitivity of these services, Member States should be given wide discretion to organise the choice of the service providers in the way they consider most appropriate. The rules of this Directive take account of that imperative, imposing only the observance of basic principles of transparency and equal treatment and making sure that contracting authorities are able to apply specific quality criteria for the choice of service providers, such as the criteria set out in the voluntary European Quality Framework for Social Services, published by the Social Protection Committee. When determining the procedures to be used for the award of contracts for services to the person, Member States should take Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 into account. In so doing, Member States should also pursue the objectives of simplification and of alleviating the administrative burden for contracting authorities and economic operators; it should be clarified that so doing might also entail relying on rules applicable to service contracts not subject to the specific regime.

Member States and public authorities remain free to provide those services themselves or to organise social services in a way that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example through the mere financing of such services or by granting licences or authorisations to all economic operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, provided that such a system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination.

Likewise, hotel and restaurant services are typically offered only by operators located in the specific place of delivery of those services and therefore also have a limited cross-border dimension. They should therefore only be covered by the light regime, as from a threshold of EUR 750 000. Large hotel and restaurant service contracts above that threshold can be of interest for various economic operators, such as travel agencies and other intermediaries, also on a cross-border basis.

Similarly, certain legal services concern exclusively issues of purely national law and are therefore typically offered only by operators located in the Member State concerned and consequently also have a limited cross-border dimension. They should therefore only be covered by the light regime, as from a threshold of EUR 750 000. Large legal service contracts above that threshold can be of interest for various economic operators, such as international law firms, also on a cross-border basis, in particular where they involve legal issues arising from or having as its background Union or other international law or involving more than one country.

Experience has shown that a series of other services, such as rescue services, firefighting services and prison services are normally only of cross-border interest as of such time as they acquire sufficient critical mass through their relatively high value. In so far as they are not excluded from the scope of this Directive, they should be included under light regime. To the extent that their provision is actually based on contracts, other categories of services, such as government services or the provision of services to the community, they would normally only be likely to present a cross-border interest as from a threshold of EUR 750 000 and should consequently only then be subject to the light regime.

In order to ensure the continuity of public services, this Directive should allow that participation in procurement procedures for certain services in the fields of health, social and cultural services could be reserved for organisations which are based on employee ownership or active employee participation in their governance, and for existing organisations such as cooperatives to participate in delivering these services to end users. This provision is limited in scope exclusively to certain health, social and related services, certain education and training services, library, archive, museum and other cultural services, sporting services, and services for private households, and is not intended to cover any of the exclusions otherwise provided for by this Directive. Those services should only be covered by the light regime.

Design contests have traditionally mostly been used in the fields of town and country planning, architecture and engineering or data processing, It should, however, be recalled that these flexible instruments could be used also for other purposes, such as to obtain plans for financial engineering that would optimise SME support in the context of the Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) or other Union SME support programmes in a given Member State. The design contest used to acquire the plans for such financial engineering could also stipulate that the subsequent service contracts for the realisation of this financial engineering would be awarded to the winner or one of the winners of the design contest by a negotiated procedure without publication.

Better guidance, information and support to contracting authorities and economic operators could also greatly contribute to enhancing the efficiency of public procurement, through better knowledge, increased legal certainty and professionalisation of procurement practices. Such guidance should be made available to contracting authorities and economic operators wherever it appears necessary to improve correct application of the rules. The guidance to be provided could cover all matters relevant to public procurement, such as acquisition planning, procedures, choice of techniques and instruments and good practices in the conduct of the procedures. With regard to legal questions, guidance should not necessarily amount to a complete legal analysis of the issues concerned; it could be limited to a general indication of the elements that should be taken into consideration for the subsequent detailed analysis of the questions, for instance by pointing to case-law that could be relevant or to guidance notes or other sources having examined the specific question concerned.

Directive 89/665/EEC provides for certain review procedures to be available at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement of Union law in the field of public procurement or national rules transposing that law. Those review procedures should not be affected by this Directive. However, citizens, concerned stakeholders, organised or not, and other persons or bodies which do not have access to review procedures pursuant to Directive 89/665/EEC do nevertheless have a legitimate interest, as taxpayers, in sound procurement procedures. They should therefore be given a possibility, otherwise than through the review system pursuant to Directive 89/665/EEC and without it necessarily involving them being given standing before courts and tribunals, to indicate possible violations of this Directive to a competent authority or structure. So as not to duplicate existing authorities or structures, Member States should be able to provide for recourse to general monitoring authorities or structures, sectoral oversight bodies, municipal oversight authorities, competition authorities, the ombudsman or national auditing authorities.

In order to fully exploit the potential of public procurement to achieve the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, environmental, social and innovation procurement will also have to play its part. It is therefore important to obtain an overview of the developments in the field of strategic procurement so as to take an informed view on the general trends at the overall level in that area. Any already prepared, appropriate reports can of course be used in this context also.

Given the potential of SMEs for job creation, growth and innovation it is important to encourage their participation in public procurement, both through appropriate provisions in this Directive as well as through initiatives at the national level. The new provisions provided for in this Directive should contribute towards an improvement of the level of success, by which is understood the share of SMEs in the total value of contracts awarded. It is not appropriate to impose obligatory shares of success, however, the national initiatives to enhance SME participation should be closely monitored given its importance.

A series of procedures and working methods have already been established in respect of the Commission’s communications and contacts with Member States, such as communications and contacts relating to the procedures provided for under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, the Internal Market Problem Solving Network (SOLVIT) and EU Pilot, which are not modified by this Directive. They should, however, be complemented by the designation of one single point of reference in each Member State for the cooperation with the Commission, which would function as sole entry point for matters concerning public procurement in the Member State concerned. This function may be performed by persons or structures which are already regularly in contact with the Commission on issues relating to public procurement, such as national contact points, members of the Advisory Committee on Public Procurement, Members of the Procurement Network or national coordinating instances.

The traceability and transparency of decision-making in procurement procedures is essential for ensuring sound procedures, including efficiently fighting corruption and fraud. Contracting authorities should therefore keep copies of concluded high-value contracts, in order to be able to provide access to those documents to interested parties in accordance with applicable rules on access to documents. Furthermore, the essential elements and decisions of individual procurement procedures should be documented in a procurement report. To avoid administrative burdens wherever possible, it should be permitted for the procurement report to refer to information already contained in the relevant contract award notice. The electronic systems for publication of those notices, managed by the Commission, should also be improved with a view to facilitating the entry of data while making it easier to extract global reports and exchange data between systems.

In the interests of administrative simplification and in order to lessen the burden on Member States, the Commission should periodically examine whether the quality and completeness of the information contained in the notices which are published in connection with public procurement procedures is sufficient to allow the Commission to extract the statistical information that would otherwise have to be transmitted by the Member States.

In order to adapt to rapid technical, economic and regulatory developments, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of a number of non-essential elements of this Directive. Due to the need to comply with international agreements, the Commission should be empowered to modify the technical procedures for the calculation methods concerning thresholds as well as to periodically revise the thresholds themselves and to adapt Annex X; the lists of central government authorities are subject to variations due to administrative changes at national level. These are notified to the Commission, which should be empowered to adapt Annex I; references to the CPV nomenclature may undergo regulatory changes at Union level and it is necessary to reflect those changes into the text of this Directive; the technical details and characteristics of the devices for electronic receipt should be kept up to date with technological developments; it is also necessary to empower the Commission to make mandatory technical standards for electronic communication to ensure the interoperability of technical formats, processes and messaging in procurement procedures conducted using electronic means of communication taking into account technological developments; the list of legal acts of the Union establishing common methodologies for the calculation of life-cycle costs should be quickly adapted to incorporate the measures adopted on a sectoral basis. In order to satisfy those needs, the Commission should be empowered to keep the list of legal acts including life-cycle costing methodologies up-to date. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. When preparing and drawing up delegated acts, the Commission should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.

In the application of this Directive the Commission should consult appropriate groups of experts in the field of e-procurement, ensuring a balanced composition of the main stakeholder groups.

The advisory procedure should be used for the adoption of the implementing acts concerning standard forms for the publication of notices, which do not have any impact either from the financial point of view or on the nature and scope of obligations stemming from this Directive. On the contrary, those acts are characterised by a mere administrative purpose and serve to facilitate the application of the rules set out in this Directive.

The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of the standard form for self-declarations, due to the impact of those self-declarations on procurement and because they play a central role in the simplification of the documentation requirements in the procurement procedures.

In accordance with Article XXII(7) thereof, the GPA shall be the subject of further negotiations three years after its entry into force and periodically thereafter. In that context, the appropriateness of the level of thresholds should be examined, bearing in mind the impact of inflation in view of a long period without changes of the thresholds in the GPA; in the event that the level of thresholds should change as a consequence, the Commission should, where appropriate, adopt a proposal for a legal act amending the thresholds set out in this Directive.

Having regard to current discussions on horizontal provisions governing relations with third countries in the context of public procurement the Commission should closely monitor global trade conditions and assess the Union’s competitive position.

Since the objective of this Directive, namely the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States applying to certain public procurement procedures, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

Directive 2004/18/EC should be repealed.

In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents of 28 September 2011, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified,