TITLE IVRESOLUTION
CHAPTER IVResolution tools
Section 5The bail-in tool
Subsection 4Bail-in tool: ancillary provisions
Article 56Government financial stabilisation tools
1
Member States may provide extraordinary public financial support through additional financial stabilisation tools in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, Article 37(10) and with Union State aid framework, for the purpose of participating in the resolution of an institution or an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), including by intervening directly in order to avoid its winding up, with a view to meeting the objectives for resolution referred to in Article 31(2) in relation to the Member State or the Union as a whole. Such an action shall be carried out under the leadership of the competent ministry or the government in close cooperation with the resolution authority.
2
In order to give effect to the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that their competent ministries or governments have the relevant resolution powers specified in Articles 63 to 72, and shall ensure that Articles 66, 68, 83 and 117 apply.
3
The government financial stabilisation tools shall be used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as determined by the competent ministry or the government after consulting the resolution authority.
4
When applying the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that their competent ministries or governments and the resolution authority apply the tools only if all the conditions laid down in Article 32(1) as well as one of the following conditions are met:
a
the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority, after consulting the central bank and the competent authority, determine that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system;
b
the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority determine that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank has previously been given to the institution;
c
in respect of the temporary public ownership tool, the competent ministry or government, after consulting the competent authority and the resolution authority, determines that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where public equity support through the equity support tool has previously been given to the institution.
5
The financial stabilisation tools shall consist of the following:
a
public equity support tool as referred to in Article 57;
b
temporary public ownership tool as referred to in Article 58.