Recent terrorist attacks have brought to light emerging new trends, in particular regarding the way terrorist groups finance and conduct their operations. Certain modern technology services are becoming increasingly popular as alternative financial systems, whereas they remain outside the scope of Union law or benefit from exemptions from legal requirements, which might no longer be justified. In order to keep pace with evolving trends, further measures should be taken to ensure the increased transparency of financial transactions, of corporate and other legal entities, as well as of trusts and legal arrangements having a structure or functions similar to trusts (‘similar legal arrangements’), with a view to improving the existing preventive framework and to more effectively countering terrorist financing. It is important to note that the measures taken should be proportionate to the risks.

The United Nations (UN), Interpol and Europol have been reporting on the increasing convergence between organised crime and terrorism. The nexus between organised crime and terrorism and the links between criminal and terrorist groups constitute an increasing security threat to the Union. Preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing is an integral part of any strategy addressing that threat.

While there have been significant improvements in the adoption and implementation of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and the endorsement of the work of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on transparency by Member States in recent years, the need to further increase the overall transparency of the economic and financial environment of the Union is clear. The prevention of money laundering and of terrorist financing cannot be effective unless the environment is hostile to criminals seeking shelter for their finances through non-transparent structures. The integrity of the Union financial system is dependent on the transparency of corporate and other legal entities, trusts and similar legal arrangements. This Directive aims not only to detect and investigate money laundering, but also to prevent it from occurring. Enhancing transparency could be a powerful deterrent.

While the aims of Directive (EU) 2015/849 should be pursued and any amendments to it should be consistent with the Union’s ongoing action in the field of countering terrorism and terrorist financing, such amendments should be made having due regard to the fundamental right to the protection of personal data, as well as the observance and application of the proportionality principle. The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘The European Agenda on Security’ indicated the need for measures to address terrorist financing in a more effective and comprehensive manner, highlighting that the infiltration of financial markets allows for the financing of terrorism. The European Council conclusions of 17-18 December 2015 also stressed the need to take rapidly further action against terrorist financing in all domains.

The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council entitled ‘Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing’ underscores the need to adapt to new threats and to amend Directive (EU) 2015/849 accordingly.

Union measures should also accurately reflect developments and commitments undertaken at international level. Therefore, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2195 (2014) on Threats to international peace and security and UNCSRs 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, should be taken into account. Those UNSCRs deal with, respectively, the links between terrorism and transnational organised crime, preventing terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions and expanding the sanctions framework to include Islamic State in Iraq and Levant.

Providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies (that is to say coins and banknotes that are designated as legal tender and electronic money, of a country, accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country) as well as custodian wallet providers are under no Union obligation to identify suspicious activity. Therefore, terrorist groups may be able to transfer money into the Union financial system or within virtual currency networks by concealing transfers or by benefiting from a certain degree of anonymity on those platforms. It is therefore essential to extend the scope of Directive (EU) 2015/849 so as to include providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies as well as custodian wallet providers. For the purposes of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), competent authorities should be able, through obliged entities, to monitor the use of virtual currencies. Such monitoring would provide a balanced and proportional approach, safeguarding technical advances and the high degree of transparency attained in the field of alternative finance and social entrepreneurship.

The anonymity of virtual currencies allows their potential misuse for criminal purposes. The inclusion of providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies and custodian wallet providers will not entirely address the issue of anonymity attached to virtual currency transactions, as a large part of the virtual currency environment will remain anonymous because users can also transact without such providers. To combat the risks related to the anonymity, national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) should be able to obtain information allowing them to associate virtual currency addresses to the identity of the owner of virtual currency. In addition, the possibility to allow users to self-declare to designated authorities on a voluntary basis should be further assessed.

Local currencies, also known as complementary currencies, that are used in very limited networks such as a city or a region and among a small number of users should not be considered to be virtual currencies.

Business relationships or transactions involving high-risk third countries should be limited when significant weaknesses in the AML/CFT regime of the third-countries concerned are identified, unless adequate additional mitigating measures or countermeasures are applied. When dealing with such cases of high-risk and with such business relationships or transactions, Member States should require obliged entities to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures to manage and mitigate those risks. Each Member State therefore determines at national level the type of enhanced due diligence measures to be taken with regard to high-risk third countries. Those different approaches between Member States create weak spots on the management of business relationships involving high-risk third countries as identified by the Commission. It is important to improve the effectiveness of the list of high-risk third countries established by the Commission by providing for a harmonised treatment of those countries at Union level. That harmonised approach should primarily focus on enhanced customer due diligence measures, where such measures are not already required under national law. In accordance with international obligations, Member States should be allowed to require obliged entities, where applicable, to apply additional mitigating measures complementary to the enhanced customer due diligence measures, in accordance with a risk based approach and taking into account the specific circumstances of business relationships or transactions. International organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing may call for the application of appropriate countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial risks relating to money laundering and terrorist financing emanating from certain countries. In addition, Member States should require obliged entities to apply additional mitigating measures regarding high-risk third countries identified by the Commission by taking into account calls for countermeasures and recommendations, such as those expressed by the FATF, and responsibilities resulting from international agreements.

Given the evolving nature of threats and vulnerabilities relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism, the Union should adopt an integrated approach on the compliance of national AML/CFT regimes with the requirements at Union level, by taking into consideration an effectiveness assessment of those national regimes. For the purpose of monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national AML/CFT regimes, the effective implementation of those requirements and the capacity of those regimes to achieve an effective preventive framework, the Commission should base its assessment on the national AML/CFT regimes, which should be without prejudice to assessments conducted by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, such as the FATF or the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism.

General purpose prepaid cards have legitimate uses and constitute an instrument contributing to social and financial inclusion. However, anonymous prepaid cards are easy to use in financing terrorist attacks and logistics. It is therefore essential to deny terrorists this means of financing their operations, by further reducing the limits and maximum amounts under which obliged entities are allowed not to apply certain customer due diligence measures provided for by Directive (EU) 2015/849. Therefore, while having due regard to consumers’ needs in using general purpose prepaid instruments and not preventing the use of such instruments for promoting social and financial inclusion, it is essential to lower the existing thresholds for general purpose anonymous prepaid cards and to identify the customer in the case of remote payment transactions where the transaction amount exceeds EUR 50.

While the use of anonymous prepaid cards issued in the Union is essentially limited to the Union territory only, that is not always the case with similar cards issued in third countries. It is therefore important to ensure that anonymous prepaid cards issued outside the Union can be used in the Union only where they can be considered to comply with requirements equivalent to those set out in Union law. That rule should be enacted in full compliance with Union obligations in respect of international trade, especially the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.

FIUs play an important role in identifying the financial operations of terrorist networks, especially cross-border, and in detecting their financial backers. Financial intelligence might be of fundamental importance in uncovering the facilitation of terrorist offences and the networks and schemes of terrorist organisations. Due to a lack of prescriptive international standards, FIUs maintain significant differences as regards their functions, competences and powers. Member States should endeavour to ensure a more efficient and coordinated approach to deal with financial investigations related to terrorism, including those related to the misuse of virtual currencies. The current differences should however not affect an FIU’s activity, particularly its capacity to develop preventive analyses in support of all the authorities in charge of intelligence, investigative and judicial activities, and international cooperation. In the exercise of their tasks, FIUs should have access to information and be able to exchange it without impediments, including through appropriate cooperation with law enforcement authorities. In all cases of suspected criminality and, in particular, in cases involving the financing of terrorism, information should flow directly and quickly without undue delays. It is therefore essential to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of FIUs, by clarifying the powers of and cooperation between FIUs.

FIUs should be able to obtain from any obliged entity all the necessary information relating to their functions. Their unfettered access to information is essential to ensure that flows of money can be properly traced and illicit networks and flows detected at an early stage. The need for FIUs to obtain additional information from obliged entities based on a suspicion of money laundering or financing of terrorism might be triggered by a prior suspicious transaction report reported to the FIU, but might also be triggered through other means such as the FIU’s own analysis, intelligence provided by competent authorities or information held by another FIU. FIUs should therefore in the context of their functions be able to obtain information from any obliged entity, even without a prior report being made. This does not include indiscriminate requests for information to the obliged entities in the context of the FIU's analysis, but only information requests based on sufficiently defined conditions. An FIU should also be able to obtain such information on a request made by another Union FIU and to exchange the information with the requesting FIU.

The purpose of the FIU is to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis as well as additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism. An FIU should not refrain from or refuse the exchange of information to another FIU, spontaneously or upon request, for reasons such as a lack of identification of an associated predicate offence, features of criminal national laws and differences between the definitions of associated predicate offences or the absence of a reference to particular associated predicate offences. Similarly, an FIU should grant its prior consent to another FIU to forward the information to competent authorities regardless of the type of possible associated predicate offence in order to allow the dissemination function to be carried out effectively. FIUs have reported difficulties in exchanging information based on differences in national definitions of certain predicate offences, such as tax crimes, which are not harmonised by Union law. Such differences, should not hamper the mutual exchange, the dissemination to competent authorities and the use of that information as defined by this Directive. FIUs should rapidly, constructively and effectively ensure the widest range of international cooperation with third countries’ FIUs in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing in accordance with the FATF Recommendations and Egmont Principles for Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units.

Information of a prudential nature relating to credit and financial institutions, such as information relating to the fitness and properness of directors and shareholders, to the internal control mechanisms, to governance or to compliance and risk management, is often indispensable for the adequate AML/CFT supervision of such institutions. Similarly, AML/CFT information is also important for the prudential supervision of such institutions. Therefore, the exchange of confidential information and collaboration between AML/CFT competent authorities supervising credit and financial institutions and prudential supervisors should not be hampered by legal uncertainty which might arise as a result of the absence of explicit provisions in this field. Clarification of the legal framework is even more important since prudential supervision has, in a number of cases, been entrusted to non-AML/CFT supervisors, such as the European Central Bank (ECB).

Delayed access to information by FIUs and other competent authorities on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, especially anonymous ones, hampers the detection of transfers of funds relating to terrorism. National data allowing the identification of bank and payments accounts and safe-deposit boxes belonging to one person is fragmented and therefore not accessible to FIUs and to other competent authorities in a timely manner. It is therefore essential to establish centralised automated mechanisms, such as a register or data retrieval system, in all Member States as an efficient means to get timely access to information on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, their proxy holders, and their beneficial owners. When applying the access provisions, it is appropriate for pre-existing mechanisms to be used provided that national FIUs can access the data for which they make inquiries in an immediate and unfiltered manner. Member States should consider feeding such mechanisms with other information deemed necessary and proportionate for the more effective mitigation of risks relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Full confidentiality should be ensured in respect of such inquiries and requests for related information by FIUs and competent authorities other than those authorities responsible for prosecution.

In order to respect privacy and protect personal data, the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of AML/CFT investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank and payment accounts, such as registers or data retrieval systems. It should be possible for Member States to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather, taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. When transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms, Member States should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. It should be possible for Member States to extend the retention period on a general basis by law, without requiring case-by-case decisions. The additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. That period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings. Access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis.

In order to identify politically exposed persons in the Union, lists should be issued by Member States indicating the specific functions which, in accordance with national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, qualify as prominent public functions. Member States should request each international organisation accredited on their territories to issue and keep up to date a list of prominent public functions at that international organisation.

The approach for the review of existing customers in the current framework is risk-based. However, given the higher risk of money laundering, terrorist financing and associated predicate offences associated with certain intermediary structures, that approach might not allow for the timely detection and assessment of risks. It is therefore important to ensure that certain clearly specified categories of existing customers are also monitored on a regular basis.

Member States are currently required to ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership. The need for accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise be able to hide their identity behind a corporate structure. The globally interconnected financial system makes it possible to hide and move funds around the world, and money launderers and terrorist financers as well as other criminals have increasingly made use of that possibility.

The specific factor determining which Member State is responsible for the monitoring and registration of beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be clarified. Due to differences in the legal systems of Member States, certain trusts and similar legal arrangements are not monitored or registered anywhere in the Union. Beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be registered where the trustees of trusts and persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements are established or where they reside. In order to ensure the effective monitoring and registration of information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, cooperation between Member States is also necessary. The interconnection of Member States’ registries of beneficial owners of trusts and similar legal arrangements would make this information accessible, and would also ensure that the multiple registration of the same trusts and similar legal arrangements is avoided within the Union.

Rules that apply to trusts and similar legal arrangements with respect to access to information relating to their beneficial ownership should be comparable to the corresponding rules that apply to corporate and other legal entities. Due to the wide range of types of trusts that currently exists in the Union, as well as an even greater variety of similar legal arrangements, the decision on whether or not a trust or a similar legal arrangement is comparably similar to corporate and other legal entities should be taken by Member States. The aim of the national law transposing those provisions should be to prevent the use of trusts or similar legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering, terrorist financing or associated predicate offences.

With a view to the different characteristics of trusts and similar legal arrangements, Member States should be able, under national law and in accordance with data protection rules, to determine the level of transparency with regard to trusts and similar legal arrangements that are not comparable to corporate and other legal entities. The risks of money laundering and terrorist financing involved can differ, based on the characteristics of the type of trust or similar legal arrangement and the understanding of those risks can evolve over time, for instance as a result of the national and supranational risk assessments. For that reason, it should be possible for Member States to provide for wider access to information on beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, if such access constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure with the legitimate aim of preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. When determining the level of transparency of the beneficial ownership information of such trusts or similar legal arrangements, Member States should have due regard to the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, in particular the right to privacy and protection of personal data. Access to beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be granted to any person that can demonstrate a legitimate interest. Access should also be granted to any person that files a written request in relation to a trust or similar legal arrangement which holds or owns a controlling interest in any corporate or other legal entity incorporated outside the Union, through direct or indirect ownership, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means. The criteria and conditions granting access to requests for beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be sufficiently precise and in line with the aims of this Directive. It should be possible for Member States to refuse a written request where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the written request is not in line with the objectives of this Directive.

In order to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field, it is essential to clearly set out which legal arrangements established across the Union should be considered similar to trusts by effect of their functions or structure. Therefore, each Member State should be required to identify the trusts, if recognised by national law, and similar legal arrangements that may be set up pursuant to its national legal framework or custom and which have structure or functions similar to trusts, such as enabling a separation or disconnection between the legal and the beneficial ownership of assets. Thereafter, Member States should notify to the Commission the categories, description of the characteristics, names and where applicable legal basis of those trusts and similar legal arrangements in view of their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in order to enable their identification by other Member States. It should be taken into account that trusts and similar legal arrangements may have different legal characteristics throughout the Union. Where the characteristics of the trust or similar legal arrangement are comparable in structure or functions to the characteristics of corporate and other legal entities, public access to beneficial ownership information would contribute to combating the misuse of trusts and similar legal arrangements, similar to the way public access can contribute to the prevention of the misuse of corporate and other legal entities for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Public access to beneficial ownership information allows greater scrutiny of information by civil society, including by the press or civil society organisations, and contributes to preserving trust in the integrity of business transactions and of the financial system. It can contribute to combating the misuse of corporate and other legal entities and legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, both by helping investigations and through reputational effects, given that anyone who could enter into transactions is aware of the identity of the beneficial owners. It also facilitates the timely and efficient availability of information for financial institutions as well as authorities, including authorities of third countries, involved in combating such offences. The access to that information would also help investigations on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.

Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership, such as the one in the Union. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors. The potential increase in confidence in financial markets should be regarded as a positive side effect and not the purpose of increasing transparency, which is to create an environment less likely to be used for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of corporate and other legal entities as well as certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements. Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, by establishing clear rules of access by the public, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities as well as of certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements.

Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information on corporate and other legal entities in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, through the central registers in which beneficial ownership information is set out, by establishing a clear rule of public access, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities. It is essential to also establish a coherent legal framework that ensures better access to information relating to beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, once they are registered within the Union. Rules that apply to trusts and similar legal arrangements with respect to access to information relating to their beneficial ownership should be comparable to the corresponding rules that apply to corporate and other legal entities.

In all cases, both with regard to corporate and other legal entities, as well as trusts and similar legal arrangements, a fair balance should be sought in particular between the general public interest in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and the data subjects’ fundamental rights. The set of data to be made available to the public should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so as to minimise the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners. At the same time, information made accessible to the public should not significantly differ from the data currently collected. In order to limit the interference with the right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular, that information should relate essentially to the status of beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities and of trusts and similar legal arrangements and should strictly concern the sphere of economic activity in which the beneficial owners operate. In cases where the senior managing official has been identified as the beneficial owner only ex officio and not through ownership interest held or control exercised by other means, this should be clearly visible in the registers. With regard to information on beneficial owners, Member States can provide for information on nationality to be included in the central register particularly for non-native beneficial owners. In order to facilitate registry procedures and as the vast majority of beneficial owners will be nationals of the state maintaining the central register, Member States may presume a beneficial owner to be of their own nationality where no entry to the contrary is made.

The enhanced public scrutiny will contribute to preventing the misuse of legal entities and legal arrangements, including tax avoidance. Therefore, it is essential that the information on beneficial ownership remains available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of registers for a minimum of five years after the grounds for registering beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement have ceased to exist. However, Member States should be able to provide by law for the processing of the information on beneficial ownership, including personal data for other purposes if such processing meets an objective of public interest and constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to the legitimate aim pursued.

Moreover, with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection, it should be possible for Member States to provide for exemptions to the disclosure through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information, in exceptional circumstances, where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation. It should also be possible for Member States to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register, as well as the payment of a fee for access to the information in the register.

Where the reporting of discrepancies by the FIUs and competent authorities would jeopardise an on-going investigation, the FIUs or competent authorities should delay the reporting of the discrepancy until the moment at which the reasons for not reporting cease to exist. Furthermore, FIUs and competent authorities should not report any discrepancy when this would be contrary to any confidentiality provision of national law or would constitute a tipping-off offence.

This Directive is without prejudice to the protection of personal data processed by competent authorities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/680.

Access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the trustee of a trust or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides. Where the trustee of the trust or person holding equivalent position in similar legal arrangement is not established or does not reside in any Member State, access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement is registered in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.

Member States should define legitimate interest, both as a general concept and as a criterion for accessing beneficial ownership information in their national law. In particular, those definitions should not restrict the concept of legitimate interest to cases of pending administrative or legal proceedings, and should enable to take into account the preventive work in the field of anti-money laundering, counter terrorist financing and associate predicate offences undertaken by non-governmental organisations and investigative journalists, where appropriate. Once the interconnection of Member States’ beneficial ownership registers is in place, both national and cross-border access to each Member State’s register should be granted based on the definition of legitimate interest of the Member State where the information relating to the beneficial ownership of the trust or similar legal arrangement has been registered in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, by virtue of a decision taken by the relevant authorities of that Member State. In relation to Member States’ beneficial ownership registers, it should also be possible for Member States to establish appeal mechanisms against decisions which grant or deny access to beneficial ownership information. With a view to ensuring coherent and efficient registration and information exchange, Member States should ensure that their authority in charge of the register set up for the beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements cooperates with its counterparts in other Member States, sharing information concerning trusts and similar legal arrangements governed by the law of one Member State and administered in another Member State.

Cross-border correspondent relationships with a third-country’s respondent institution are characterised by their on-going, repetitive nature. Accordingly, Member States, while requiring the adoption of enhanced due diligence measures in this particular context, should take into consideration that correspondent relationships do not include one-off transactions or the mere exchange of messaging capabilities. Moreover, recognising that not all cross-border correspondent banking services present the same level of money laundering and terrorist financing risks, the intensity of the measures laid down in this Directive can be determined by application of the principles of the risk based approach and do not prejudge the level of money laundering and terrorist financing risk presented by the respondent financial institution.

It is important to ensure that anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing rules are correctly implemented by obliged entities. In that context, Member States should strengthen the role of public authorities acting as competent authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing, including the FIUs, the authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets, authorities receiving reports on cross-border transportation of currency and bearer-negotiable instruments and authorities that have supervisory or monitoring responsibilities aimed at ensuring compliance by obliged entities. Member States should strengthen the role of other relevant authorities including anti-corruption authorities and tax authorities.

Member States should ensure effective and impartial supervision of all obliged entities, preferably by public authorities via a separate and independent national regulator or supervisor.

Criminals move illicit proceeds through numerous financial intermediaries to avoid detection. Therefore it is important to allow credit and financial institutions to exchange information not only between group members, but also with other credit and financial institutions, with due regard to data protection rules as set out in national law.

Competent authorities supervising obliged entities for compliance with this Directive should be able to cooperate and exchange confidential information, regardless of their respective nature or status. To this end, such competent authorities should have an adequate legal basis for exchange of confidential information, and collaboration between AML/CFT competent supervisory authorities and prudential supervisors should not be hampered unintentionally by legal uncertainty which may stem from a lack of explicit provisions in this field. The supervision of the effective implementation of group policy on AML/CFT should be done in accordance with the principles and modalities of consolidated supervision as laid down in the relevant European sectoral legislation.

The exchange of information and the provision of assistance between competent authorities of the Members States is essential for the purposes of this Directive. Consequently, Member States should not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on this exchange of information and provision of assistance.

Since the objective of this Directive, namely the protection of the financial system by means of prevention, detection and investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, as individual measures adopted by Member States to protect their financial systems could be inconsistent with the functioning of the internal market and with the prescriptions of the rule of law and Union public policy, but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in particular the right to respect for private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter), the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter).

When drawing up a report evaluating the implementation of this Directive, the Commission should give due consideration to the respect of the fundamental rights and principles recognised by the Charter.

Given the need to urgently implement measures adopted with a view to strengthen the Union’s regime set in place for the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and seeing the commitments undertaken by Member States to quickly proceed with the transposition of Directive (EU) 2015/849, the amendments to Directive (EU) 2015/849 should be transposed by 10 January 2020. Member States should set up beneficial ownership registers for corporate and other legal entities by 10 January 2020 and for trusts and similar legal arrangements by 10 March 2020. Central registers should be interconnected via the European Central Platform by 10 March 2021. Member States should set up centralised automated mechanisms allowing the identification of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes by 10 September 2020.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 should therefore be amended accordingly,