

Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011
concerning restrictive measures directed against certain
persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran⁽¹⁾, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union,

Having regard to the joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and from the European Commission,

Whereas:

- (1) Decision 2011/235/CFSP provides for the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. Those persons and entities are listed in the Annex to the Decision.
- (2) The restrictive measures should target persons complicit in or responsible for directing or implementing grave human rights violations in the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression, as well as persons complicit in or responsible for directing or implementing grave violations of the right to due process, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or the indiscriminate, excessive and increasing application of the death penalty, including public executions, stoning, hangings or executions of juvenile offenders in contravention of Iran's international human rights obligations.
- (3) Those measures fall within the scope of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and regulatory action at the level of the Union is therefore necessary in order to implement them, in particular with a view to ensuring their uniform application by economic operators in all Member States.
- (4) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and the right to the protection of personal data. This Regulation should be applied in accordance with those rights.

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- (5) The power to amend the list in Annex I to this Regulation should be exercised by the Council, in view of the political situation in Iran, and to ensure consistency with the process for amending and reviewing the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP.
- (6) The procedure for amending the lists in Annex I to this Regulation should include providing designated persons, entities or bodies with the grounds for listing, so as to give them an opportunity to submit observations. Where observations are submitted, or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council should review its decision in light of those observations and inform the person, entity or body concerned accordingly.
- (7) For the implementation of this Regulation, and in order to create maximum legal certainty within the Union, the names and other relevant data concerning natural and legal persons, entities and bodies whose funds and economic resources must be frozen in accordance with this Regulation, must be made public. Any processing of personal data should respect Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data⁽²⁾ and Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data⁽³⁾.
- (8) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, this Regulation must enter into force on the day of its publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

- (a) ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including but not limited to:
 - (i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;
 - (ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;
 - (iii) publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;
 - (iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;
 - (v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;
 - (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;
 - (vii) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources;
- (b) ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume,

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amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;

- (c) ‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
- (d) ‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing their use to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;
- (e) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.

[^{F1}Article 1a

[_{F2}1.] It shall be prohibited:

- a to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran;
- b to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran;
- c to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran;
- d to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c).

[_{F2}2.] By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States, as listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III provided that it is intended solely for the protective use of the personnel of the Union and its Member States in Iran, or the provision of technical assistance or brokering services or of financing or financial assistance referred to in paragraph 1(b) and (c) related to such equipment.]

Textual Amendments

- F1** Inserted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)
- F2** Inserted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 1245/2012 of 20 December 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

Article 1b

1 It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment, technology or software identified in Annex IV, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran, unless the competent authority

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of the relevant Member State, as identified in the websites referred to in Annex II, has given prior authorisation.

2 The competent authorities of the Member States, as identified in the websites referred to in Annex II, shall not grant any authorisation under paragraph 1 if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the equipment, technology or software in question would be used for monitoring or interception, by Iran's government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, of internet or telephone communications in Iran.

3 Annex IV shall include equipment, technology or software which may be used for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.

4 The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article, within four weeks following the authorisation.

Textual Amendments

- F1** Inserted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

Article 1c

- 1 It shall be prohibited:
- a to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of the equipment and technology identified in Annex IV or to the provision, installation, operation or updating of any software identified in Annex IV, to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran;
 - b to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV, to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran;
 - c to provide any telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services of any kind to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, Iran's government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction; and
 - d to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in any activity the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) above;

unless the competent authority of the relevant Member State, as identified in the websites referred to in Annex II, has given prior authorisation, on the basis set out in Article 1b(2).

2 For the purposes of paragraph 1(c), 'telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services' means those services that provide, in particular using equipment, technology or software as identified in Annex IV, access to and delivery of a subject's incoming and outgoing telecommunications and call- associated data for the purpose of its extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis and storing or any other related activity.]

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Textual Amendments

- F1** Inserted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

Article 2

- 1 All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
- 2 No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I.
- 3 The participation, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be prohibited.

Article 3

- 1 Annex I shall consist of a list of persons who, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Decision 2011/235/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as being persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran, and persons, entities or bodies associated with them.
- 2 Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of listed persons, entities and bodies concerned.
- 3 Annex I shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

Article 4

- 1 By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are:
 - a necessary to satisfy the basic needs of persons listed in Annex I and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
 - b intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
 - c intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; or
 - d necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the Member State concerned has notified all other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks prior to the authorisation.
- 2 The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

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Article 5

1 By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

- a the funds or economic resources in question are the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien established prior to the date on which the person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial, administrative or arbitral judgment rendered prior to that date;
- b the funds or economic resources in question will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a lien or recognised as valid in such a judgment, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
- c the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
- d recognising the lien or judgment is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

2 The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

Article 6

1 Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- a interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
- b payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 has been listed in Annex I,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments are also frozen in accordance with Article 2(1).

2 Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions in the Union from crediting frozen accounts where they receive funds transferred to the account of a listed natural or legal person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent authority about any such transaction without delay.

Article 7

By way of derogation from Article 2, and provided that a payment by a person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for the person, entity or body concerned, before the date on which that person, entity or body had been designated, the competent authorities of the Member States, as indicated on the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, if the following conditions are met:

- (a) the competent authority concerned has determined that:
 - (i) the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and
 - (ii) the payment is not in breach of Article 2(2); and

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- (b) the Member State concerned has, at least 2 weeks prior to granting the authorisation, notified the other Member States and the Commission of that determination and its intention to grant an authorisation.

Article 8

1 The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or withheld as a result of negligence.

2 The prohibition set out in Article 2(2) shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on the part of the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies who made funds or economic resources available if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the prohibition in question.

Article 9

1 Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

- a supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, to the competent authority in the Member State where they are resident or located, as indicated on the websites listed in Annex II, and shall transmit such information, either directly or through the Member States, to the Commission; and
- b cooperate with that competent authority in any verification of that information.

2 Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

Article 10

Member States and the Commission shall immediately inform each other of measures taken under this Regulation and shall supply each other with any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of violations, enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

Article 11

The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

Article 12

1 Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2(1), it shall amend Annex I accordingly.

2 The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.

3 Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and shall inform the person, entity or body accordingly.

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4 The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

Article 13

1 Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2 Member States shall notify the Commission of those rules without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment to them.

Article 14

Where there is, in this Regulation, a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

Article 15

This Regulation shall apply:

- (a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;
- (b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;
- (c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;
- (d) to any legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;
- (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

Article 16

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

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ANNEX I

List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

PERSONS

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
[^{F3} 1.	AHMADI-MOQADDAM Esmail	POB: Tehran (Iran) — DOB: 1961	Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Former Chief of Iran's National Police until early 2015. Forces under his command led brutal attacks on peaceful protests, and a violent night-time attack on the dormitories of Tehran University on 15 June 2009.	
2.	ALLAHKARAM Hossein	POB: Najafabad (Iran) — DOB: 1945	Ansar-e Hezbollah Chief and Colonel in the IRGC. He co-founded Ansar-e Hezbollah. Under his leadership, this paramilitary force was responsible for extreme violence during crackdown against students and universities in 1999, 2002 and 2009.]
3.	ARAGHI (ERAGHI) Abdollah		Deputy Head of IRGC's Ground Forces.	

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			He had a direct and personal responsibility in the crackdown of protests all through the Summer of 2009.	
[^{F3} 4.	FAZLI Ali		Deputy Commander of the Basij, former Head of the IRGC's Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province (until February 2010). The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps is in charge of security in Tehran province and played a key role under his responsibility in brutal repression of protesters in 2009.]
[^{F4}]				
6.	JAFARI Mohammad-Ali (a.k.a. 'Aziz Jafari')	POB: Yazd (Iran) - DOB: 1.9.1957	General Commander of the IRGC. IRGC and the Sarollah Base commanded by General Aziz Jafari has played a key role in illegally interfering with the 2009 Presidential Elections, arresting and detaining political activists, as well as clashing with protestors in the streets.	

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7.	KHALILI Ali		IRGC General, Head of the Medical Unit of Sarollah Base. He signed a letter sent to the Ministry of Health June 26 2009 forbidding the submission of documents or medical records to anyone injured or hospitalized during post-elections events.	
[^{F38} .	MOTLAGH Bahram Hosseini		Head of the Army Command and General Staff College (DAFOOS). Former Head of the IRGC's Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province. Under his responsibility, the Seyyed al-Shohada Corps played a key role in organising the repression of protests.]
9.	NAQDI Mohammad-Reza	POB: Najaf (Iraq) – DOB: Circa 1952	Commander of the Basij. As commander of the IRGC's Basij Forces, Naqdi was responsible for or complicit in Basij abuses occurring in late 2009, including the violent response to the December 2009 Ashura Day protests, which resulted in up	

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			to 15 deaths and the arrests of hundreds of protesters. Prior to his appointment as commander of the Basij in October 2009, Naqdi was the head of the intelligence unit of the Basij responsible for interrogating those arrested during the post-election crackdown.	
[^{F3} 10.	RADAN Ahmad-Reza	POB: Isfahan (Iran) — DOB:1963	He is in charge of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force, a body linked to the National Police. Former Head of the Police Strategic Studies Centre, former Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police until June 2014. As Deputy Chief of National Police from 2008, Radan was responsible for beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions against protestors that were committed by the police forces.	12.4.2011]
[^{F5} 11.	RAJABZADEH Azizollah		Head of Tehran Disaster]

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			<p>Mitigation Organization (TDMO). Former Head of Tehran Police (until January 2010). As Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces in the Greater Tehran, Azizollah Rajabzadeh is the highest ranking accused in the case of abuses in Kahrizak Detention Center.</p>	
12.	SAJEDI-NIA Hossein		<p>Head of Tehran Police, former Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police responsible for Police Operations. He is in charge of coordinating, for the Ministry of Interior, repression operations in the Iranian capital.</p>	
[^{F6} 13.	TAEB Hossein	POB: Tehran — DOB: 1963	<p>Deputy IRGC commander for intelligence. Former Commander of the Basij until October 2009. Forces under his command participated in mass beatings, murders, detentions and tortures</p>	12.4.2011

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			of peaceful protesters.	
[^{F3} 14.	SHARIATI Seyeed Hassan		Advisor and Member of the 28th Section of the Supreme Court. Former Head of Mashhad Judiciary until September 2014. Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily and inside closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused, and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.	12.4.2011]
15.	DORRI- NADJAFABADI Ghorban-Ali	POB: Najafabad (Iran) — DOB: 1945	Member of the Assembly of Experts and representative of the Supreme Leader in Markazi ('Central') Province. Former Prosecutor General of Iran until September 2009, as well as former Intelligence minister under	12.4.2011]

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			Khatami presidency. As Prosecutor General of Iran, he ordered and supervised the show trials following the first post-election protests, where the accused were denied their rights, and an attorney. He also carries responsibility for the Kahrizak abuses.	
[^{F3} 16.	HADDAD Hassan (alias Hassan ZAREH DEHNAVI)		Deputy Safety Officer of Teheran Revolutionary Court. Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of the detainee cases related to the post election crises and regularly threatened families of detainees in order to silence them. He has been instrumental in issuing detention orders to the Kahrizak Detention Centre. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised	12.4.2011

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			by the Iranian authorities.	
17.	SOLTANI Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad		Head of the Organisation for Islamic Propaganda in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Former Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court. Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.]
[^{F6} 18.	HEYDARIFAR Ali-Akbar		Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court. He participated in protesters trials. He was questioned by the Judiciary about Kahrizak exactions. He was instrumental in issuing detention orders to consign detainees to Kahrizak Detention Centre. In November 2014, his role in the deaths	12.4.2011

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			of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities.
19.	JAFARI-DOLATABADI Abbas	POB: Yazd (Iran) — DOB: 1953	Prosecutor general of Tehran since August 2009. Dolatabadi's office indicted a large number of protesters, including individuals who took part in the December 2009 Ashura Day protests. He ordered the closure of Karroubi's office in September 2009 and the arrest of several reformist politicians, and he banned two reformist political parties in June 2010. His office charged protesters with the charge of Muharebeh, or enmity against God, which carries a death sentence, and denied due process to those facing the death sentence. His office also targeted and arrested reformists, human rights activists, and members of the media, as

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			part of a broad crackdown on the political opposition.	
[^{F7} 20.	MOGHISSEH Mohammad (a.k.a. NASSERIAN)		Judge, Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 28. Also considered responsible for condemnations of members of the Bahai community. He has dealt with post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials for social, political activists and journalists and several death sentences for protesters and social and political activists.	12.4.2011]
21.	MOHSENI-EJEI Gholam-Hossein	POB: Ejiyeh - DOB: circa 1956	Prosecutor General of Iran since September 2009 and spokesman of the Judiciary, and former Intelligence minister during the 2009 elections. While he was Intelligence minister during the 2009 election, intelligence agents under his command were responsible for detention, torture and extraction of	12.4.2011

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			<p>false confessions under pressure from hundreds of activists, journalists, dissidents, and reformist politicians. In addition, political figures were coerced into making false confessions under unbearable interrogations, which included torture, abuse, blackmail, and the threatening of family members.</p>	
[^{F7} 22.	MORTAZAVI Said	POB: Meybod, Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1967	<p>Former Prosecutor General of Tehran until August 2009. As Tehran Prosecutor General, he issued a blanket order used for the detention of hundreds of activists, journalists and students. In January 2010 a parliamentary investigation held him directly responsible for the detention of three prisoners who subsequently died in custody. He was suspended from office in August 2010 after an investigation</p>	12.4.2011

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			by the Iranian judiciary into his role in the deaths of the three men detained on his orders following the election. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities. He was acquitted by an Iranian Court on August 19, 2015, on charges connected to the torture and deaths of three young men at the Kahrizak detention center in 2009.	
23.	PIR-ABASSI Abbas		Magistrate of a Criminal chamber. Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases, he issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.	12.4.2011]]
[^{F3} 24.	MORTAZAVI Amir		Deputy head of the Unit for Social Affairs and Crime Prevention at the judiciary in the province]

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			<p>of Khorasan-Razavi. Former Deputy Prosecutor of Mashhad. Trials under his prosecution have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.</p>	
[^{F7} 25.	SALAVATI Abdolghassem		<p>Judge, Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 15. Committing Judge in the Tehran Tribunal. In charge of the post-election cases, he was the Judge presiding the 'show trials' in summer 2009, he condemned to death two monarchists that appeared in the show trials. He has sentenced more than a hundred political prisoners, human rights activists and demonstrators to lengthy prison sentences.</p>	12.4.2011]

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[^{F3} 26.	SHARIFI Malek Adjar		Judge at the Supreme Court. Former Head of East Azerbaidjan Judiciary. He was responsible for Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani's trial.]
[^{F5} 27.	ZARGAR Ahmad		Head of the 'Organization for the Preservation of Morality'. Former judge, Tehran Appeals Court, branch 36. He confirmed long-term jail warrants and death warrants against protesters.]
[^{F6} 28.	YASAGHI Ali- Akbar		Judge of the Supreme Court. Former Chief Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court. Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.	12.4.2011]
29.	BOZORGNIA Mostafa		Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison. He unleashed	

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			on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.	
[^{F6} 30.	ESMAILI Gholam-Hossein		Head of the Tehran Judiciary. Former Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation. In this capacity, he was complicit to the massive detention of political protesters and covering up abuses performed in the jailing system.	12.4.2011]
31.	SEDAQAT Farajollah		Assistant Secretary of the General Prison Administration in Tehran - Former Head of Evin's prison, Tehran until October 2010 during which time torture took place. He was warden and threatened and exerted pressure on prisoners numerous times.	
32.	ZANJIREI Mohammad-Ali		As Deputy Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation, responsible for abuses and deprivation of rights in detention center. He ordered the transfer of many inmates into solitary confinement.	

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[^{F7} 33.	ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI, Mahmoud		Secretary of the Human Right Council. Former governor of Ilam Province. Former Interior Ministry's political director. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties. In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mousavi — the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organization. From 2009 onwards he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, therefore denying a constitutional right to protest and leading to many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention	10.10.2011]
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			of the right to freedom of assembly. He also denied in 2009 the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the Presidential elections.	
[^{F3} 34.	AKBARSHAHI Ali-Reza		Director-General of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (a.k.a. Anti-Narcotics Headquarters). Former Commander of Tehran Police. Under his leadership, the police force was responsible for the use of extrajudicial force on suspects during arrest and pre-trial detention. The Tehran police were also implicated in raids on Tehran university dorms in June 2009, when according to an Iranian Majlis commission, more than 100 students were injured by the police and Basij.	10.10.2011]
[^{F8} [^{F7} 35.	AKHARIAN Hassan		Former keeper of Ward 1 of Radjaishahr prison, Karadj. Several former	10.10.2011

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			<p>detainees have denounced the use of torture by him, as well as orders he gave to prevent inmates receiving medical assistance. According to a transcript of one reported detainee in the Radjaishahr prison, wardens all beat him severely, with Akharian's full knowledge. There is also at least one reported case of the death of a detainee, Mohsen Beikvand, under Akharian's wardenship.</p>	
36.	<p>AVAEE Seyyed Ali-Reza (Aka: AVAEE Seyyed Alireza)</p>		<p>Director of the special investigations office. Until July 2016 deputy Minister of Interior and head of the Public register. Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges since April 2014. Former President of the Tehran Judiciary. As President of the Tehran Judiciary he has been responsible for human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, denials of</p>	10.10.2011]

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			prisoners' rights and an increase in executions.	
[^{F6} 37.	BANESHI Jaber		Advisor to the Judiciary in Iran. Former Prosecutor of Shiraz until 2012. He was responsible for the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty by handing down dozens of death sentences. Prosecutor during the Shiraz bombing case in 2008, which was used by the regime to sentence to death several opponents of the regime.	10.10.2011]
[^{F7} 38.	FIRUZABADI Maj-Gen Dr Seyyed Hasan (Aka: FIRUZABADI Maj-Gen Dr Seyed Hassan; FIROUZABADI Maj-Gen Dr Seyyed Hasan; FIROUZABADI Maj-Gen Dr Seyed Hassan)	POB: Mashad. DOB: 3.2.1951	As former Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces, he was the highest military commander responsible for directing all military divisions and policies, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and police. Forces under his formal chain of command brutally suppressed peaceful protestors and	10.10.2011

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			perpetrated mass detentions. Also member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the Expediency Council.	
39.	GANJI Mostafa Barzegar		Former Prosecutor-General of Qom. Likely to be currently in a process of reassignment to another function. He is responsible for the arbitrary detention and maltreatment of dozens of offenders in Qom. He is complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty and a sharp increase in executions since the beginning of the year.	10.10.2011
40.	HABIBI Mohammad Reza		Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. Former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan. Likely to be currently in a process of reassignment to another function. Complicit in proceedings denying defendants a	10.10.2011

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			<p>fair trial — such as Abdollah Fathi executed in May 2011 after his right to be heard and mental health issues were ignored by Habibi during his trial in March 2010. He is, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty and a sharp increase in executions since the beginning of 2011.</p>	
41.	HEJAZI Mohammad	POB: Ispahan DOB: 1956	<p>General in Pasdaran, he has played a key role in intimidating and threatening Iran's 'enemies', and the bombing of Iraqi Kurdish villages. Former Head of the IRGC's Sarollah Corps in Tehran, and former Head of the Basij Forces, he played a central role in the post-election crackdown of protesters.</p>	10.10.2011]
[^{F9}]				
[^{F3} 43.	JAVANI Yadollah	POB: Isfahan — DOB: 1956	<p>Advisor to the Supreme Leader's representative</p>	10.10.2011]

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		to the IRGC. He regularly speaks out on media as a representative of the hard-line side of the regime. He was one of the first high-ranking officials to demand Moussavi, Karroubi and Khatami's arrest. He has repeatedly supported the use of violence and harsh interrogation tactics against post-election protesters (justifying TV-recorded confessions), including ordering the extrajudicial maltreatment of dissidents through publications circulated to the IRGC and Basij.	
44.	JAZAYERI Massoud	Deputy Chief of Staff of Iran's Joint Armed Forces, in charge of cultural affairs (aka State Defence Publicity HQ). He actively collaborated in repression as deputy chief of staff. He warned in a Kayhan interview that many protesters inside and	10.10.2011

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			outside Iran have been identified and will be dealt with at the right time. He has openly called for repression of foreign mass media outlets and Iranian opposition. In 2010, he asked the government to pass tougher laws against Iranians who cooperate with foreign media sources.	
[^{F5} 45.	JOKAR Mohammad Saleh		Since 2011 Parliamentary Deputy for Yazd Province. Former Commander of Student Basij Forces. In the capacity of Commander of Student Basij Forces he was actively involved in suppressing protests in schools and universities and extra-judicial detention of activists and journalists.	10.10.2011]
[^{F7} 46.	KAMALIAN Behrouz (Aka: Hackers Brain)	POB: Tehran DOB: 1983	Head of the IRGC- linked 'Ashiyaneh' cyber group. The 'Ashiyaneh' Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for an intensive cyber-crackdown	10.10.2011]

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			both on domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. On 21 June 2009, the internet site of the Revolutionary Guard's Cyber Defence Command 32 posted still images of the faces of 26 people, allegedly taken during post-election demonstrations. Attached was an appeal to Iranians to 'identify the rioters'.	
[^{F6} 47.	KHALILOLLAHI Moussa (Aka: KHALILOLLAHI Mousa, ELAHI Mousa Khalil)		Prosecutor of Tabriz. He was involved in Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani's case and is complicit in grave violations of the right to due process.	10.10.2011
48.	MAHSOULI Sadeq (Aka: MAHSULI, Sadeq)	POB: Oroumieh (Iran) DOB: 1959/60	Advisor to Former President and current member of the Expediency Council Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and member of the Perseverance Front. Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011. Minister of the Interior until	10.10.2011

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			<p>August 2009. As Interior Minister, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plainclothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli's control.</p>	
[^{F7} 49.	MALEKI Mojtaba		<p>Deputy head of the Ministry of Justice in the Khorasan Razavi province. Former prosecutor of Kermanshah. Has played a role in the dramatic increase in death sentences being passed in Iran, including prosecuting the cases of seven prisoners convicted of drug trafficking</p>	10.10.2011]]

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			who were hanged on the same day on 3 January 2010 in Kermanshah's central prison.	
[^{F3} 50.	OMIDI Mehrdad		Head of the Intelligence Services within the Iranian Police. Former Head of the Computer Crimes Unit of the Iranian Police. He is responsible for thousands of investigations and indictments of reformists and political opponents using the internet. He is thus responsible for grave human rights violations in the repression of persons who speak out in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression.	10.10.2011]
[^{F5} [^{F7} 51.	SALARKIA Mahmoud	Former director of Tehran Football Club 'Persepolis'	Head of the Petrol and Transport commission of the City of Tehran. Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs during the crackdown of 2009. As Deputy to the Prosecutor-	10.10.2011]

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			<p>General of Tehran for Prison Affairs he was directly responsible for many of the arrest warrants against innocent, peaceful protesters and activists. Many reports from human rights defenders show that virtually all those arrested are, on his instruction, held incommunicado without access to their lawyer or families, and without charge, for varying lengths of time, often in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. Their families are often not notified of the arrest.</p>	
[^F 652.	<p>KHODAEI SOURI Hojatollah</p>	<p>POB: Selseleh (Iran) — DOB: 1964</p>	<p>Member of the National Security and Foreign policy Committee. Parliamentary deputy for Lorestan Province. Member of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Security Policy. Former head of Evin prison until 2012. Torture was a</p>	<p>10.10.2011</p>

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			common practice in Evin prison while Sourì was its head. In Ward 209, many activists were held for their peaceful activities in opposition to the ruling government.	
[^{F7} 53.	TALA Hossein (Aka: TALA Hosseyn)		Former Iranian MP. Former Governor-General ('Farmandar') of Tehran Province until September 2010, he was responsible for the intervention of police forces and therefore for the repression of demonstrations. He received a prize in December 2010 for his role in the post-election repression.	10.10.2011]
54.	TAMADDON Morteza (Aka: TAMADON Morteza)	POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan DOB: 1959	Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as governor and head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bears overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran province,	10.10.2011]]

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			including cracking down on political protests since June 2009.	
55.	ZEBHI Hossein		Deputy to the Prosecutor General of Iran. He is in charge of several judicial cases linked to the post-elections protests.	10.10.2011
[^{F7} 56.	BAHRAMI Mohammad-Kazem		Head of the administrative justice court. He was complicit in the repression of peaceful demonstrators as head of the judiciary branch of the armed forces.	10.10.2011]
[^{F6} 57.	HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz		Judge at the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Former judge at the first chamber of the Evin Court. He conducted several trials of demonstrators, inter alia, that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. The Evin court of first instance was established within the walls of Evin prison, a fact	10.10.2011]

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			welcomed by Jafari Dolatabadi in March 2010. In this prison some accused persons have been confined, mistreated and forced to make false statements.	
58.	BAGHERI Mohammad- Bagher		Vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, about 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers being notified. He is, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty.	10.10.2011]
[^{F6} [^{F3} 59.	BAKHTIARI Seyyed Morteza	POB: Mashad (Iran) — DOB: 1952	Official of the Special Clerical Tribunal. Former Minister of	10.10.2011]

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			<p>Justice from 2009 to 2013. During his time as Minister of Justice, prison conditions within Iran fell well below accepted international standards, and there was widespread mistreatment of prisoners. In addition, he played a key role in threatening and harassing the Iranian diaspora by announcing the establishment of a special court to deal specifically with Iranians who live outside the country. He also oversaw a sharp increase in the number of executions in Iran, including secret executions not announced by the government, and executions for drug-related offences.</p>	
60.	<p>HOSSEINI Dr Mohammad (Aka: HOSSEYNI, Dr Seyyed Mohammad; Seyed, Sayyed and Sayyid)</p>	<p>POB: Rafsanjan, Kerman DOB: 1961</p>	<p>Advisor to Former President and current member of the Expediency Council Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance</p>	10.10.2011

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			(2009-2013). Ex-IRGC, he was complicit in the repression of journalists.	
[^{F3} 61.	MOSLEHI Heydar (Aka: MOSLEHI Heidar; MOSLEHI Haidar)	POB: Isfahan (Iran) — DOB: 1956	Advisor of Supreme Jurisprudence in the IRGC. Head of the organization for publications on the role of the clergy at war. Former Minister of Intelligence (2009-2013). Under his leadership, the Ministry of Intelligence continued the practices of widespread arbitrary detention and persecution of protesters and dissidents. The Ministry of Intelligence runs Ward 209 of Evin Prison, where many activists have been held on account of their peaceful activities in opposition to the government in power. Interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence have subjected prisoners in Ward 209 to beatings and mental and sexual abuse.	10.10.2011

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62.	ZARGHAMI Ezzatollah	POB: Dezful (Iran) — DOB: 22 July 1959	Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council and Cultural Revolution Council. Former Head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) until November 2014. Under his tenure at IRIB, He was responsible for all programming decisions. IRIB has broadcast forced confessions of detainees and a series of 'show trials' in August 2009 and December 2011. These constitute a clear violation of international provisions on fair trial and the right to due process.	23.3.2012
63.	TAGHIPOUR Reza	POB: Maragheh (Iran) — DOB: 1957	Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Member of the City Council of Teheran. Former Minister for Information and Communications (2009-2012). As Minister for Information, he was one of the top officials in charge of censorship and control of internet activities and	23.3.2012

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			<p>also all types of communications (in particular mobile phones). During interrogations of political detainees, the interrogators make use of the detainees' personal data, mail and communications. On several occasions following the 2009 presidential election and during street demonstrations, mobile lines and text messaging were blocked, satellite TV channels were jammed and the internet locally suspended or at least slowed down.</p>	
64.	KAZEMI Toraj		<p>Chief of the EU-designated Center to Investigate Organized Crime (a.k.a.: Cyber Crime Office or Cyber Police). In this capacity, he announced a campaign for the recruitment of government hackers in order to achieve better control of information on the internet and attack 'dangerous' sites.</p>	23.3.2012]

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65.	LARIJANI Sadeq	POB: Najaf (Iraq) DOB: 1960 or August 1961	Head of the Judiciary. The Head of the Judiciary is required to consent to and sign off every qisas (retribution), hodoud (crimes against God) and ta'zirat (crimes against the state) punishment. This includes sentences attracting the death penalty, floggings and amputations. In this regard, he has personally signed off numerous death penalty sentences, contravening international standards, including stoning, executions by suspension strangulation, execution of juveniles, and public executions such as those where prisoners have been hung from bridges in front of crowds of thousands. He has also permitted corporal punishment sentences such as amputations and the dripping of acid into the eyes of the	23.3.2012
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		convicted. Since Sadeq Larijani took office, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, human rights defenders and minorities increased markedly. Executions also increased sharply since 2009. Sadeq Larijani also bears responsibility for systemic failures in the Iranian judicial process to respect the right to a fair trial.	
66.	MIRHEJAZI Ali	Part of the Supreme Leader's inner circle, one of those responsible for planning the suppression of protests which has been implemented since 2009, and associated with those responsible for suppressing the protests.	23.3.2012]
[^{F1} 67.	SAEEDI Ali	Representative of the Guide for the Pasdaran since 1995 after spending his whole career within the institution of the military, and specifically in the Pasdaran intelligence service. This official role	23.3.2012

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			makes him the key figure in the transmission of orders emanating from the Office of the Guide to the Pasdaran's repression apparatus.	
[^{F6} 68.	RAMIN Mohammad-Ali	POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 1954	Secretary-general of the World Holocaust Foundation, established at the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust in 2006, which Ramin was responsible for organising on behalf of the Iranian Government. Main figure responsible for censorship as Vice-Minister in charge of the Press up to December 2013, being directly responsible for the closure of many reforming newspapers (Etemad, Etemad-e Melli, Shargh, etc.), closure of the Independent Press Syndicate and the intimidation or arrest of journalists.	23.3.2012
[^{F3} 69.	MORTAZAVI Seyyed Solat	POB: Farsan, Tchar Mahal-o-Bakhtiari	Mayor of the second largest city of Iran, Mashad,	23.3.2012]]

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		(South) — (Iran) — DOB: 1967	where public executions regularly happen. Former Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs. He was responsible for directing repression of persons who spoke up in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression. Later appointed as Head of the Iranian Election Committee for the parliamentary elections in 2012 and for the presidential elections in 2013.	
[^{F9}]				
[^{F4}]				
[^{F9}]				
[^{F6}][^{F7} 73.	FAHRADI Ali		Deputy head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty is passed. There	23.3.2012

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			have been a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.	
74.	REZVANMA-NESH Ali		Deputy prosecutor province of Karaj, region of Alborz. Responsible for grave violation of human rights, including involvement in the execution of a juvenile.	23.3.2012]
75.	RAMEZANI Gholamhosein		Security Chief at the Ministry of Defence. Former Chief of Protection and Security at the IRGC until March 2012. Ex-Commander of IRGC Intelligence until October 2009. Involved in the suppression of freedom of expression, including by being associated with those responsible for the arrests of bloggers/ journalists in 2004, and reported to have had a role in the suppression of the post-election protests in 2009.	23.3.2012]
[^F 76.	SADEGHI Mohamed		Colonel and Deputy of IRGC technical and cyber	23.3.2012]]

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			intelligence and in charge of the centre of analysis and fight against organized crime within the Pasdaran. Responsible for the arrests and torture of bloggers/ journalists.	
[^{F6} 77.	JAFARI Reza	DOB: 1967	Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges since 2012. Member of the 'Committee for Determining Criminal Web Content', a body responsible for web sites and social media censorship. Former Head of special prosecution of cyber crime between 2007 and 2012. Was responsible for the repression of freedom of expression, including through the arrest, detention and prosecution of bloggers and journalists. Persons arrested on suspicion of cyber crime were mistreated and the subject of an unfair judicial process.	23.3.2012
78.	RESHTE-AHMADI Bahram		Judge of an ordinary court of northern	23.3.2012

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			Tehran. Former Supervisor of Public Prosecution Office in Tehran. Deputy Head of the Office of Prison Affairs of Tehran Province. Former Deputy Prosecutor in Tehran until 2013. He ran Evin prosecution centre. Was responsible for the denial of rights, including visits and other prisoner's rights, to human rights defenders and political prisoners.	
[^{F7} 79.	RASHIDI AGHDAM, Ali Ashraf		Former head of Evin Prison, appointed in mid-2012. Since his appointment, conditions in the prison deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in protest of the violation of their rights and violent treatment by prison guards.	12.3.2013]
80.	KIASATI Morteza		Judge of the Ahwaz Revolutionary Court, Branch 4, imposed death sentences	12.3.2013

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			<p>on four Arab political prisoners, Taha Heidarian, Abbas Heidarian, Abd al-Rahman Heidarian (three brothers) and Ali Sharifi. They were arrested, tortured and hanged without due process. These cases and the lack of due process were referenced in a report dated 13 September 2012 by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, the UN Secretary General's report on Iran of 22 August 2012.</p>	
81.	MOUSSAVI, Seyed Mohammad Bagher		<p>Ahwaz Revolutionary Court judge, Branch 2, imposed death sentences on five Ahwazi Arabs, Mohammad Ali Amouri, Hashem Sha'bani Amouri, Hadi Rashedi, Sayed Jaber Alboshoka, Sayed Mokhtar Alboshoka, on 17 March 2012 for 'activities against national security' and 'enmity against God'. The sentences were upheld by Iran's</p>	12.3.2013

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			Supreme Court on 9 January 2013. The five were arrested without charge for over a year, tortured and sentenced without due process.	
[^{F7} 82.	SARAFRAZ, Mohammad (Dr.) (aka: Haj- agha Sarafraz)	POB: Tehran DOB: appr. 1963 Place of Residence: Tehran	Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Former Head of IRIB World Service and Press TV, responsible for all programming decisions. Closely associated with the state security apparatus. Under his direction Press TV, along with IRIB, has worked with the Iranian security services and prosecutors to broadcast forced confessions of detainees, including that of Iranian-Canadian journalist and film-maker Maziar Bahari, in the weekly programme 'Iran Today'. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press	12.3.2013]

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			TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting Bahari's confession in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. Sarafraz therefore is associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial.	
83.	JAFARI, Asadollah		Prosecutor of Mazandaran Province, responsible for illegal arrests and violations of the rights of Baha'i detainees from initial arrest to keeping them in solitary confinement in the Intelligence Detention Centre. Six concrete examples of cases where due process was violated have been documented. Jafari has prosecuted cases that have resulted in many executions, including public executions.	12.3.2013]
[^{F10}][^{F5} 84.	EMADI, Hamid Reza (aka: Hamidreza Emadi)	Date of Birth: appr. 1973 Place of Birth: Hamedan	Press TV Newsroom Director. Former Press TV Senior Producer.	12.3.2013]

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Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

		<p>Place of residence: Tehran Place of work: Press TV HQ, Tehran</p>	<p>Responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting the forced confession of Iranian-Canadian journalist and film-maker Maziar Bahari in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. NGOs have reported further instances of forced televised confessions by Press TV. Emadi is therefore associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial.</p>	
[^{F6} 85.	HAMLBAR, Rahim		Judge of Branch 1 of Tabriz Revolutionary	12.3.2013

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

			<p>Court. Responsible for heavy sentences against journalists and Azeri ethnic minority and workers' rights activists, accusing them of spying, acts against national security, propaganda against the Iranian regime and insulting the leader of Iran. His judgments did not follow due process on many occasions and detainees were forced into false confessions. A high profile case involved 20 volunteer earthquake relief workers (following an earthquake in Iran in August 2012) to whom he gave prison sentences for their attempts to assist earthquake victims. The court found the workers guilty of 'collaboration in assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security.'</p>	
[^{F7} 86.	MUSAVI-TABAR, Seyyed Reza		Former head of the Revolutionary Prosecution	12.3.2013]]

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

			of Shiraz. Responsible for illegal arrests and ill treatment of political activists, journalists, human rights defenders, Baha'is and prisoners of conscience, who were harassed, tortured, interrogated and denied access to lawyers and due process. Musavi-Tabar signed judicial orders in the notorious No 100 Detention Centre (a male prison), including an order to detain female Baha.i prisoner Raha Sabet for three years in solitary confinement.	
87.	KHORAMABADI Abdolsamad	Head of 'Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content'.	Abdolsamad Khoramabadi is Head of the 'Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content', a governmental organization in charge of online censorship and cyber crime. Under his leadership the Commission defined 'cybercrime' by a number of vague categories that criminalize	12.3.2013]

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

		<p>creation and publication of content deemed inappropriate by the regime. He is responsible for repression and the blocking of numerous opposition sites, electronic newspapers, blogs, sites of human rights NGOs and of Google and Gmail since September 2012. He and the Commission actively contributed to the death in detention of the blogger Sattar Beheshti in November 2012. Thus the Commission he is heading is directly responsible for systemic violations of human rights, in particular by banning and filtering websites to the general public, and occasionally disabling Internet access altogether.</p>
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Textual Amendments

- F3** Substituted by [Council Implementing Regulation \(EU\) 2016/556 of 11 April 2016 implementing Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

- F4** Deleted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/556 of 11 April 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F5** Substituted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 371/2014 of 10 April 2014 implementing Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F6** Substituted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/548 of 7 April 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F7** Substituted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/685 of 11 April 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F8** Inserted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1002/2011 of 10 October 2011 implementing Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F9** Deleted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/548 of 7 April 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.
- F10** Inserted by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 206/2013 of 11 March 2013 implementing Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.

[^{F10}ENTITIES

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
[^{F6} 1.	Centre to Investigate Organized Crime (aka: Cyber Crime Office or Cyber Police)	Location: Tehran, Iran Website: http://www.cyberpolice.ir	The Iranian Cyber Police, founded in January 2011, is a unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police, which is headed by Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam (listed). Ahmadi-Moqaddam underlined that the Cyber Police would take on anti-revolutionary and dissident groups who used internet-based social networks in 2009 to trigger protests against the re-election]]

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

		<p>of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In January 2012, the Cyber Police issued new guidelines for internet cafés, requiring users to provide personal information that would be kept by café owners for six months, as well as a record of the websites they visited. The rules also require café owners to install closed-circuit television cameras and maintain the recordings for six months. These new rules may create a logbook that authorities can use to track down activists or whomever is deemed a threat to national security. In June 2012, Iranian media reported that the Cyber Police would be launching a crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs). On 30 October 2012, the Cyber Police arrested the blogger Sattar Beheshti without a warrant for 'actions against national</p>
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Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

			security on social networks and Facebook.’ Beheshti had criticized the Iranian government in his blog. Beheshti was found dead in his prison cell on 3 November 2012, and is believed to have been tortured to death by the Cyber Police authorities.
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[^{F11} ANNEX II

Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the European Commission

Textual Amendments

- F11** Substituted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

BELGIUM

<http://www.diplomatie.be/eusanctions>

BULGARIA

<http://www.mfa.bg/en/pages/view/5519>

CZECH REPUBLIC

<http://www.mfcr.cz/mezinarodnisankce>

DENMARK

<http://um.dk/da/politik-og-diplomati/retsorden/sanktioner/>

GERMANY

<http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Aussenwirtschaft/Aussenwirtschaftsrecht/embargos.html>

ESTONIA

http://www.vm.ee/est/kat_622/

IRELAND

<http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=28519>

GREECE

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

<http://www1.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html>
SPAIN

http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Asuntos/Sanciones%20Internacionales/Paginas/Sanciones_%20Internacionales.aspx
FRANCE

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/autorites-sanctions/>
[^{F12}CROATIA

<http://www.mvep.hr/sankcije>
ITALY

http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Europea/Deroghe.htm
CYPRUS

<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/sanctions>
LATVIA

<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539>
LITHUANIA

<http://www.urm.lt/sanctions>
LUXEMBOURG

<http://www.mae.lu/sanctions>
HUNGARY

http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/nemzetkozi_szankciok/
MALTA

http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/bodies/boards/sanctions_monitoring.asp
NETHERLANDS

<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-vrede-en-veiligheid/sancties>
AUSTRIA

http://www.bmeia.gov.at/view.php3?f_id=12750&LNG=en&version=
POLAND

<http://www.msz.gov.pl>
PORTUGAL

<http://www.min-nestrangeiros.pt>
ROMANIA

<http://www.mae.ro/node/1548>
SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika_in_mednarodno_pravo/zunanja_politika/mednarodna_varnost/omejevalni_ukrepi/
SLOVAKIA

<http://www.foreign.gov.sk>
FINLAND

<http://formin.finland.fi/kvyhteistyopakotteet>
SWEDEN

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

<http://www.ud.se/sanktioner>
UNITED KINGDOM

www.fco.gov.uk/competentauthorities
Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

Office EEAS 02/309

B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel (Belgium)

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

[^{F1}ANNEX III

List of equipment which might be used for internal repression as referred to in Article 1a

1. Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows:
 - 1.1 Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List;
 - 1.2 Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor;
 - 1.3 Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.
2. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List.
3. Vehicles as follows:
 - 3.1 Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control;
 - 3.2 Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders;
 - 3.3 Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection;
 - 3.4 Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees;
 - 3.5 Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers;
 - 3.6 Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control.

Note 1 This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of fire-fighting.

Note 2 For the purposes of item 3.5 the term 'vehicles' includes trailers.
4. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows:

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

- 4.1 Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g., car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators);
- 4.2 Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List;
- 4.3 Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows:
 - a. amatol;
 - b. nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen);
 - c. nitroglycol;
 - d. pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - e. picryl chloride;
 - f. 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).
5. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows:
 - 5.1 Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection;
 - 5.2 Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields.

Note: This item does not control:

 - *equipment specially designed for sports activities;*
 - *equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements.*
6. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor.
7. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List.
8. Razor barbed wire.
9. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm.
10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list.
11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.]

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

[^{F1}ANNEX IV

Equipment, technology and software referred to in Articles 1b and 1c

General Note

Notwithstanding the contents of this Annex, it shall not apply to:

- (a) equipment, technology or software which are specified in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009⁽⁴⁾ or the Common Military List; or
- (b) software which is designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier and which is generally available to the public by being sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of:
 - (i) over the counter transactions;
 - (ii) mail order transactions;
 - (iii) electronic transactions; or
 - (iv) telephone order transactions; or
- (c) software which is in the public domain.

The categories A, B, C, D and E refer to the categories referred to in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.

The 'equipment, technology and software' referred to in Article 1b is:

- A. List of equipment
 - Deep Packet Inspection equipment
 - Network Interception equipment including Interception Management Equipment (IMS) and Data Retention Link Intelligence equipment
 - Radio Frequency monitoring equipment
 - Network and Satellite jamming equipment
 - Remote Infection equipment
 - Speaker recognition/processing equipment
 - IMSI⁽⁵⁾, MSISDN⁽⁶⁾, IMEI⁽⁷⁾, TMSI⁽⁸⁾ interception and monitoring equipment
 - Tactical SMS⁽⁹⁾ /GSM⁽¹⁰⁾ /GPS⁽¹¹⁾ /GPRS⁽¹²⁾ /UMTS⁽¹³⁾ /CDMA⁽¹⁴⁾ /PSTN⁽¹⁵⁾ interception and monitoring equipment
 - DHCP⁽¹⁶⁾ /SMTP⁽¹⁷⁾, GTP⁽¹⁸⁾ information interception and monitoring equipment
 - Pattern Recognition and Pattern Profiling equipment
 - Remote Forensics equipment
 - Semantic Processing Engine equipment
 - WEP and WPA code breaking equipment
 - Interception equipment for VoIP proprietary and standard protocol
- B. Not used
- C. Not used
- D. 'Software' for the 'development', 'production' or 'use' of the equipment specified in A above.

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

E. 'Technology' for the 'development', 'production' or 'use' of the equipment specified in A above.

Equipment, technology and software falling within these categories is within the scope of this Annex only to the extent that it falls within the general description 'internet, telephone and satellite communications interception and monitoring systems'.

For the purpose of this Annex 'monitoring' means acquisition, extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis and archiving call content or network data.]

Status: Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011. (See end of Document for details)

- (1) See page 51 of this Official Journal.
- (2) [OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.](#)
- (3) [OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.](#)
- (4) [^{F1}Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items ([OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1.](#))]
- (5) [^{F1}IMSI stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is a unique identification code for each mobile telephony device, integrated in the SIM card and which allows identification of such SIM via GSM and UMTS networks.]
- (6) [^{F1}MSISDN stands for Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number. It is a number uniquely identifying a subscription in a GSM or a UMTS mobile network. Simply put, it is the telephone number to the SIM card in a mobile phone and therefore it identifies a mobile subscriber as well as IMSI, but to route calls through him.]
- (7) [^{F1}IMEI stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity. It is a number, usually unique to identify GSM, WCDMA and IDEN mobile phones as well as some satellite phones. It is usually found printed inside the battery compartment of the phone. interception (wiretapping) can be specified by its IMEI number as well as IMSI and MSISDN.]
- (8) [^{F1}TMSI stands for Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity. It is the identity that is most commonly sent between the mobile and the network.]
- (9) [^{F1}SMS stands for Short Message System.]
- (10) [^{F1}GSM stands for Global System for Mobile Communications.]
- (11) [^{F1}GPS stands for Global Positioning System.]
- (12) [^{F1}GPRS stands for General Package Radio Service.]
- (13) [^{F1}UMTS stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunication System.]
- (14) [^{F1}CDMA stands for Code Division Multiple Access.]
- (15) [^{F1}PSTN stands for Public Switch Telephone Networks.]
- (16) [^{F1}DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.]
- (17) [^{F1}SMTP stands for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.]
- (18) [^{F1}GTP stands for GPRS Tunnelling Protocol.]

Textual Amendments

- F1** Inserted by [Council Regulation \(EU\) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012 amending Regulation \(EU\) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran.](#)

Status:

Point in time view as at 13/04/2017.

Changes to legislation:

There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.