Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilShow full title

Article 23 Measures linking effectiveness of ESI Funds to sound economic governance

1. The Commission may request a Member State to review and propose amendments to its Partnership Agreement and relevant programmes, where this is necessary to support the implementation of relevant Council Recommendations or to maximise the growth and competitiveness impact of the ESI Funds in Member States receiving financial assistance.

Such a request may be made for the following purposes:

(a) to support the implementation of a relevant country-specific recommendation adopted in accordance with Article 121(2) TFEU and of a relevant Council recommendation adopted in accordance with Article 148(4) TFEU, addressed to the Member State concerned;

(b) to support the implementation of relevant Council Recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned and adopted in accordance with Articles 7(2) or 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011(1) of the European Parliament and of the Council provided that these amendments are deemed necessary to help correct the macro-economic imbalances; or

(c) to maximise the growth and competitiveness impact of the available ESI Funds, if a Member State meets one of the following conditions:

(i)

Union financial assistance is made available to it under Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010(2);

(ii)

financial assistance is made available to it in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002(3);

(iii)

financial assistance is made available to it that triggers a macroeconomic adjustment programme in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) or that triggers a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 136(1) TFEU.

For the purposes of point (b) of the second subparagraph, each of those conditions shall be deemed to be satisfied where such assistance has been made available to the Member State before or after 21 December 2013 and remains available to it.

2. A request by the Commission to a Member State in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be justified, with reference to the need to support the implementation of the relevant recommendations or to maximise the growth and competitiveness impact of the ESI Funds as appropriate, and shall indicate the programmes or priorities which it considers are concerned and the nature of the amendments expected. Such a request shall not be made before 2015 or after 2019, nor in relation to the same programmes in two consecutive years.

3. The Member State shall submit its response to the request referred to in paragraph 1 within two months of its receipt, setting out the amendments it considers necessary in the Partnership Agreement and programmes, the reasons for such amendments, identifying the programmes concerned and outlining the nature of the amendments proposed and their expected effects on the implementation of recommendations and on the implementation of the ESI Funds. If necessary, the Commission shall make observations within one month of the receipt of that response.

4. The Member State shall submit a proposal to amend the Partnership Agreement and the relevant programmes within two months of the date of submission of the response referred to in paragraph 3.

5. Where the Commission has not submitted observations or where the Commission is satisfied that any observations submitted have been duly taken into account, the Commission shall adopt a decision approving the amendments to the Partnership Agreement and the relevant programmes without undue delay and in any event not later than three months after their submission by the Member State in accordance with paragraph 3.

6. Where the Member State fails to take effective action in response to a request made in accordance with paragraph 1, within the deadlines set out in paragraphs 3 and 4, the Commission may, within three months following its observations under paragraph 3 or following the submission of the proposal of the Member State under paragraph 4, propose to the Council that it suspend part or all of the payments for the programmes or priorities concerned. In its proposal, the Commission shall set out the grounds for concluding that the Member State has failed to take effective action. In making its proposal, the Commission shall take account of all relevant information, and shall give due consideration to any elements arising from and opinions expressed through the structured dialogue under paragraph 15.

The Council shall decide on that proposal, by means of an implementing act. That implementing act shall only apply with respect to requests for payment submitted after the date of the adoption of that implementing act.

7. The scope and level of the suspension of payments imposed in accordance with paragraph 6, shall be proportionate and effective, and respect equality of treatment between Member States, in particular with regard to the impact of the suspension on the economy of the Member State concerned. The programmes to be suspended shall be determined on the basis of the needs identified in the request referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

The suspension of payments shall not exceed 50 % of the payments of each of the programmes concerned. The decision may provide for an increase in the level of the suspension up to 100 % of payments if the Member State fails to take effective action in response to a request made in accordance with paragraph 1, within three months of the decision to suspend payments referred to in paragraph 6.

8. Where the Member State has proposed amendments to the Partnership Agreement and the relevant programmes as requested by the Commission, the Council acting on a proposal from the Commission shall decide on the lifting of the suspension of payments.

9. The Commission shall make a proposal to the Council to suspend part or all of the commitments or payments for the programmes of a Member State in the following cases:

(a) where the Council decides in accordance with Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) TFEU that a Member State has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit;

(b) where the Council adopts two successive recommendations in the same imbalance procedure, in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the grounds that a Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan;

(c) where the Council adopts two successive decisions in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 establishing non-compliance by a Member State on the grounds that it has not taken the recommended corrective action;

(d) where the Commission concludes that a Member State has not taken measures to implement the adjustment programme referred to in Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 or Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 and as a consequence decides not to authorise the disbursement of the financial assistance granted to that Member State;

(e) where the Council decides that a Member State does not comply with the macro-economic adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, or with the measures requested by a Council decision adopted in accordance with Article 136(1) TFEU.

In making its proposal, the Commission shall respect the provisions of paragraph 11 and shall take account of all relevant information in that regard, and it shall give due consideration to any elements arising from and opinions expressed through the structured dialogue under paragraph 15.

Priority shall be given to the suspension of commitments: payments shall be suspended only when immediate action is sought and in the case of significant non-compliance. The suspension of payments shall apply to requests for payment submitted for the programmes concerned after the date of the decision to suspend.

10. A proposal by the Commission referred to in paragraph 9 in relation to the suspension of commitments shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless the Council decides, by means of an implementing act, to reject such a proposal by qualified majority within one month of the submission of the Commission proposal. The suspension of commitments shall apply to the commitments from the ESI Funds for the Member State concerned from 1 January of the year following the decision to suspend.

The Council shall adopt a decision, by means of an implementing act, on a proposal by the Commission referred to in paragraph 9 in relation to the suspension of payments.

11. The scope and level of the suspension of commitments or payments to be imposed on the basis of paragraph 10, shall be proportionate, respect the equality of treatment between Member States and take into account the economic and social circumstances of the Member State concerned, in particular the level of unemployment of the Member State concerned in relation to the Union average and the impact of the suspension on the economy of the Member State concerned. The impact of suspensions on programmes of critical importance to address adverse economic or social conditions shall be a specific factor to be taken into account.

Detailed provisions for determining the scope and level of suspensions are set out in Annex III.

The suspension of commitments shall be subject to the lower of the following ceilings:

(a) A maximum of 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the first case of non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure as referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 and a maximum 25 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the first case of non-compliance relating to a corrective action plan under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 or non-compliance with the recommended corrective action pursuant to an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9.

The level of the suspension shall increase gradually up to a maximum of 100 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the case of an excessive deficit procedure and up to 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds in the case of an excessive imbalance procedure, in line with the seriousness of the non-compliance;

(b) a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP applying in the first case of non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure as referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 and a maximum of 0,25 % of nominal GDP applying in the first case of non-compliance relating to a corrective action plan under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 or non-compliance with recommended corrective action under an excessive imbalances procedure as referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9.

If non-compliance relating to corrective actions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 persists, the percentage of that GDP cap shall be gradually increased up to:

• (b) a maximum of 1 % of nominal GDP applying in the event of persistent non-compliance with an excessive deficit procedure in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9; and

• a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP applying in the event of persistent non-compliance with an excessive imbalance procedure in accordance with point (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9, in line with the seriousness of the non-compliance;

(c) a maximum of 50 % of the commitments relating to the next financial year for the ESI Funds or a maximum of 0,5 % of nominal GDP in the first case of non-compliance as referred to in points (d) and (e) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9.

In determining the level of the suspension and whether to suspend commitments or payments, the stage of the programme cycle shall be taken into account having regard in particular to the period remaining for using the funds following the re-budgeting of suspended commitments.

12. Without prejudice to de-commitment rules set out in Articles 86 to 88 the Commission shall lift the suspension of commitments, without delay, in the following cases:

(a) where the excessive deficit procedure is held in abeyance in accordance with Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(5) or the Council has decided in accordance with Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit;

(b) where the Council has endorsed the corrective action plan submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 or the excessive imbalance procedure is placed in a position of abeyance in accordance with Article 10(5) of that Regulation or the Council has closed the excessive imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 11 of that Regulation;

(c) where the Commission has concluded that the Member State concerned has taken adequate measures to implement the adjustment programme referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 or the measures requested by a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 136(1) TFEU.

When lifting the suspension of commitments, the Commission shall re-budget the suspended commitments in accordance with Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013.

A decision concerning the lifting of the suspension of payments shall be taken by the Council on a proposal from the Commission where the applicable conditions set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph are fulfilled.

13. Paragraphs 6 to 12 shall not apply to the United Kingdom in so far as the suspension of commitments or of payments relate to matters covered by points (a), (b) and (c)(iii) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 or points (a), (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9.

14. This Article shall not apply to programmes under the European territorial cooperation goal.

15. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament informed of the implementation of this Article. In particular the Commission shall, when one of the conditions set out in paragraph 6 or points (a) to (e) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 9 is fulfilled for a Member State, immediately inform the European Parliament and provide details of the ESI Funds and programmes which could be subject to a suspension of commitments or payments.

The European Parliament may invite the Commission for a structured dialogue on the application of this Article, having regard in particular to the transmission of the information referred to in the first sub-paragraph.

The Commission shall transmit the proposal for suspension of commitments or payments or the proposal to lift such a suspension to the European Parliament and the Council immediately after its adoption. The European Parliament may invite the Commission to explain the reasons for its proposal.

16. In 2017, the Commission shall carry out a review of the application of this Article. To this end, the Commission shall prepare a report which it shall transmit to the European Parliament and the Council, accompanied where necessary by a legislative proposal.

17. Where there are major changes in the social and economic situation in the Union, the Commission may submit a proposal to review the application of this Article, or the European Parliament or the Council, acting in accordance with Articles 225 or 241 TFEU respectively, may request the Commission to submit such a proposal.

(1)

Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25).

(2)

Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism (OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 1).

(3)

Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments (OJ L 53, 23.2.2002, p. 1).

(4)

Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (OJ L 140, 27.05.2013, p. 1).

(5)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6).