Limitation Act 1980

This Part of this Act gives the ordinary time limits for bringing actions of the various classes mentioned in the following provisions of this Part.

The ordinary time limits given in this Part of this Act are subject to extension or exclusion in accordance with the provisions of Part II of this Act.

Where any cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel has accrued to any person and, before he recovers possession of the chattel, a further conversion takes place, no action shall be brought in respect of the further conversion after the expiration of six years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion.

Where any such cause of action has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action has expired and he has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished.

The right of any person from whom a chattel is stolen to bring an action in respect of the theft shall not be subject to the time limits under sections 2 and 3(1) of this Act, but if his title to the chattel is extinguished under section 3(2) of this Act he may not bring an action in respect of a theft preceding the loss of his title, unless the theft in question preceded the conversion from which time began to run for the purposes of section 3(2).

Subsection (1) above shall apply to any conversion related to the theft of a chattel as it applies to the theft of a chattel; and, except as provided below, every conversion following the theft of a chattel before the person from whom it is stolen recovers possession of it shall be regarded for the purposes of this section as related to the theft.

If anyone purchases the stolen chattel in good faith neither the purchase nor any conversion following it shall be regarded as related to the theft.

Any cause of action accruing in respect of the theft or any conversion related to the theft of a chattel to any person from whom the chattel is stolen shall be disregarded for the purpose of applying section 3(1) or (2) of this Act to his case.

Where in any action brought in respect of the conversion of a chattel it is proved that the chattel was stolen from the plaintiff or anyone through whom he claims it shall be presumed that any conversion following the theft is related to the theft unless the contrary is shown.

Where by virtue of a relevant provision a person becomes entitled to bring an action against any other person, no action may be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

Where by virtue of section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 a person became entitled, before the commencement date, to bring an action against any other person, this section applies in relation to the action as if the reference in subsection (1) to 15 years were a reference to 30 years.

In subsection (4) “the commencement date” means the day on which section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 came into force.

An action in respect of breach of the term implied into a contract of insurance by section 13A of the Insurance Act 2015 (late payment of claims) may not be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the insurer has paid all the sums referred to in subsection (1) of that section.

Any payment which extinguishes an insurer's liability to pay a sum referred to in section 13A of the Insurance Act 2015 is to be treated for the purposes of this section as payment of that sum.

Subject to subsection (3) below, section 5 of this Act shall not bar the right of action on a contract of loan to which this section applies.

Where a demand in writing for repayment of the debt under a contract of loan to which this section applies is made by or on behalf of the creditor (or, where there are joint creditors, by or on behalf of any one of them) section 5 of this Act shall thereupon apply as if the cause of action to recover the debt had accrued on the date on which the demand was made.

In this section “promissory note” has the same meaning as in the M1Bills of Exchange Act 1882.

An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Subsection (1) above shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act.

An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Subsection (1) above shall not affect any action to which section 10 F78or 10A of this Act applies.

Where under section 1 of the M2Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 any person becomes entitled to a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage from any other person, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which that right accrued.

For the purposes of this section the date on which a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage accrues to any person (referred to below in this section as “the relevant date”) shall be ascertained as provided in subsections (3) and (4) below.

If, in any case not within subsection (3) above, the person in question makes or agrees to make any payment to one or more persons in compensation for that damage (whether he admits any liability in respect of the damage or not), the relevant date shall be the earliest date on which the amount to be paid by him is agreed between him (or his representative) and the person (or each of the persons, as the case may be) to whom the payment is to be made.

An action to recover contribution shall be one to which sections 28, 32F65... and 35 of this Act apply, but otherwise Parts II and III of this Act (except sections 34, 37 and 38) shall not apply for the purposes of this section.

Where by virtue of section 5 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 an insurer or vehicle owner becomes entitled to bring an action against any person, the action shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which the right of action accrued (under subsection (5) of that section).

An action referred to in subsection (1) shall be one to which sections 32, 33A and 35 of this Act apply, but otherwise Parts 2 and 3 of this Act (except sections 37 and 38) shall not apply for the purposes of this section.

An action under section 148 of the Building Safety Act 2022 shall not be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

In subsections (2) and (3) “the commencement date” is the day on which section 149 of the Building Safety Act 2022 came into force.

No other period of limitation prescribed by Part 1 of this Act applies in relation to an action referred to in subsections (1) and (2).

Sections 28, 32 and 35 of this Act apply in relation to an action referred to subsections (1) and (2), but otherwise Parts 2 and 3 of this Act (except sections 37 and 38) do not apply for the purposes of this section.

This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.

This section does not apply to any action brought for damages under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which this section applies.

An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) or (5) below.

For the purposes of this section “personal representative” includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate) but not anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in relation to settled land; and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.

If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

This section shall apply to an action for damages by virtue of any provision of Part I of the M4Consumer Protection Act 1987.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which this section applies.

An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of ten years from the relevant time, within the meaning of section 4 of the said Act of 1987; and this subsection shall operate to extinguish a right of action and shall do so whether or not that right of action had accrued, or time under the following provisions of this Act had begun to run, at the end of the said period of ten years.

For the purposes of this section “personal representative” includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate) but not anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in relation to settled land; and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.

If there is more than one personal representative and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

Expressions used in this section or section 14 of this Act and in Part I of the M6Consumer Protection Act 1987 have the same meanings in this section or that section as in that Part; and section 1(1) of that Act (Part I to be construed as enacted for the purpose of complying with the product liability Directive) shall apply for the purpose of construing this section and the following provisions of this Act so far as they relate to an action by virtue of any provision of that Part as it applies for the purpose of construing that Part.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action for damages under section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (liability of insurer etc where accident caused by automated vehicle).

But this subsection does not affect the application of section 5A of this Act.

This subsection applies where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries (to the claimant or any other person).

If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

In this section “personal representative” has the same meaning as in section 11 of this Act.

An action under the M7Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Act or in any other Act, or for any other reason).

Where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 11 F79, 11A or 11B of this Act, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 33 of this Act.

An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be one to which sections 28, 33 F66...F60, 33B and 35 of this Act apply, and the application to any such action of the time limit under subsection (2) above shall be subject to section 39; but otherwise Parts II and III of this Act shall not apply to any such action.

Where there is more than one person for whose benefit an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is brought, section 12(2)(b) of this Act shall be applied separately to each of them.

Subject to subsection (3) below, if by virtue of subsection (1) above the action would be outside the time limit given by section 12(2) as regards one or more, but not all, of the persons for whose benefit it is brought, the court shall direct that any person as regards whom the action would be outside that limit shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought.

The court shall not give such a direction if it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of the person in question it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 28 of this Act or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).

For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the person whose date of knowledge is in question would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of this Act applies, where the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) below falls after the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Section 2 of this Act shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.

An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) below.

For the purposes of this section, the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) above is the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action.

For the purposes of subsection (6)(a) above, the material facts about the damage are such facts about the damage as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

Knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (5) above.

No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.

Subsection (2) above shall not apply to any estate or interest which falls into possession on the determination of an entailed interest and which might have been barred by the person entitled to the entailed interest.

No person shall bring an action to recover any estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom he claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest, unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought such an action.

Where any person is entitled to any estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to any future estate or interest in that land, and his right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Act, no action shall be brought by that person, or by any person claiming through him, in respect of the future estate or interest, unless in the meantime possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.

Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act contains provisions for determining the date of accrual of rights of action to recover land in the cases there mentioned.

Part II of that Schedule contains provisions modifying the provisions of this section in their application to actions brought by, or by a person claiming through, the Crown or any spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole.

Subject to section 21(1) and (2) of this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply to equitable interests in land F9. . . as they apply to legal estates.

Accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Act but not otherwise, be treated as accruing to a person entitled in possession to such an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances, and on the same date, as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in the land (and any relevant provision of Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act shall apply in any such case accordingly).

Where any land is held upon trust F9. . . and the period prescribed by this Act has expired for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustees, the estate of the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land F9. . . either has not accrued or has not been barred by this Act; but if and when every such right of action has been so barred the estate of the trustees shall be extinguished.

No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued.

But if the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property after that date, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not be treated as having accrued for the purposes of this subsection until the date on which his possession discontinued.

The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be treated as accruing so long as that property comprises any future interest or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined.

Nothing in this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Act relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action.

Subject to subsections (6) and (7) below, no action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.

Where a trustee who is also a beneficiary under the trust receives or retains trust property or its proceeds as his share on a distribution of trust property under the trust, his liability in any action brought by virtue of subsection (1)(b) above to recover that property or its proceeds after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for bringing an action to recover trust property shall be limited to the excess over his proper share.

This subsection only applies if the trustee acted honestly and reasonably in making the distribution

Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued.

For the purposes of this subsection, the right of action shall not be treated as having accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.

No beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Act shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action and this Act had been pleaded in defence.

An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of six years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable.

No arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.

Subject to section 75 of the M9Land Registration Act 1925, at the expiration of the period prescribed by this Act for any person to bring an action to enforce an advowson the title of that person to the advowson shall be extinguished. F12

If the person taking possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, or any other person whatsoever (other than a person entitled to possession by virtue of the settlement) is in possession of the land for a period of twelve years from the commencement of the time when the assurance could have operated as an effective bar, the assurance shall thereupon operate, and be treated as having always operated, to bar the issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect on the determination of the entailed interest.

The reference in subsection (2) above to the time when the assurance could have operated as an effective bar is a reference to the time at which the assurance, if it had then been executed by the person entitled to the entailed interest, would have operated, without the consent of any other person, to bar the issue in tail and the estates and interests taking effect on the determination of the entailed interest.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of proceeds of unlawful conduct).

Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of F4220 years from the date on which the F13relevant person's cause of action accrued.

Subsection (4) is subject to section 13(5) of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (which provides that, in the case of property obtained through unlawful conduct relating to a gross human rights abuse or violation, proceedings cannot be brought after the end of the period of 20 years from the date on which the conduct constituting the commission of the abuse or violation occurs).

If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.

Expressions used in this section and Part 5 of that Act have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Part 4A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (giving effect to external request by means of civil proceedings).

Proceedings under that Part for a prohibition order in respect of relevant property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of 20 years from the date on which the relevant person’s cause of action accrued.

Proceedings under that Part are brought when an application is made for a prohibition order.

The relevant person’s cause of action accrues in respect of relevant property when the property is obtained (or when it is believed to have been obtained) as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (civil proceedings for the realisation of property to give effect to an external order).

Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of F4320 years from the date on which the F18relevant person's cause of action accrued.

If, before an event mentioned in subsection (3) occurs, an application is made for a prohibition order under Part 4A of the Order, the proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Order are to be treated as having been brought when that application is made.

If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.

None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to proceedings under Part 7 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (criminal memoirs etc ) for an exploitation proceeds order.

Proceedings under that Part for such an order are not to be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the enforcement authority's cause of action accrued.

Proceedings under that Part for such an order are brought when an application is made for the order.

Where exploitation proceeds have been obtained by a person from a relevant offence, an enforcement authority's cause of action under that Part in respect of those proceeds accrues when the enforcement authority has actual knowledge that the proceeds have been obtained.

Expressions used in this section and that Part have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.

Subject to the following provisions of this section, if on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.

This section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims.

When a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under a disability, no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person.

No action to recover land or money charged on land shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of thirty years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims.

If the action is one to which section 10 of this Act applies, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “two years”.

If the action is one to which section 11 F82, 11B or 12(2) of this Act applies, subsection (1) above shall have effect as if for the words “six years” there were substituted the words “three years”.

An action may not be brought by virtue of subsection (1) above after the end of the period of limitation prescribed by section 14B of this Act.

Subsections (2) and (3) below apply where any right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or an advowson or any right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property has accrued.

In the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee, if the person in possession of the land, benefice or personal property in question or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect of the debt (whether of principal or interest) the right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the payment.

A payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but any payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt.

Subject to subsection (6) above, a current period of limitation may be repeatedly extended under this section by further acknowledgments or payments, but a right of action, once barred by this Act, shall not be revived by any subsequent acknowledgment or payment.

To be effective for the purposes of section 29 of this Act, an acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person making it.

An acknowledgment of the title to any land, benefice, or mortgaged personalty by any person in possession of it shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.

A payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or any other person liable for the debt, or by any person in possession of the mortgaged property, shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.

Where two or more mortgagees are by virtue of the mortgage in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of his equity of redemption by one of the mortgagees shall only bind him and his successors and shall not bind any other mortgagee or his successors.

Where in a case within subsection (3) above the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to any ascertained part of the mortgage debt the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment, with interest, of the part of the mortgage debt which bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the whole of the mortgaged land.

Where there are two or more mortgagors, and the title or equity of redemption of one of the mortgagors is acknowledged as mentioned above in this section, the acknowledgment shall be treated as having been made to all the mortgagors.

An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person.

A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect of the debt or claim.

An acknowledgment by one of several personal representatives of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in any such estate, or a payment by one of several personal representatives in respect of any such claim, shall bind the estate of the deceased person.

In this section “successor”, in relation to any mortgagee or person liable in respect of any debt or claim, means his personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve (whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise).

For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.

Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to the time limit prescribed by section 11A(3) of this Act or in relation to that time limit as applied by virtue of section 12(1) of this Act.

Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to the time limit prescribed by section 11B(2) or (4) of this Act or in relation to that time limit as applied by virtue of section 12(1) of this Act.

Sections 14A and 14B of this Act shall not apply to any action to which subsection (1)(b) above applies (and accordingly the period of limitation referred to in that subsection, in any case to which either of those sections would otherwise apply, is the period applicable under section 2 of this Act).

In this section “ the court ” means the court in which the action has been brought.

The court shall not under this section disapply any provision of section 11 in its application to an overseas armed forces action if the action was brought after the expiration of the period of six years from the section 11 relevant date (see subsection (7)).

Where the damages claimed are confined to damages for loss of or damage to any property, the court shall not under this section disapply any provision in its application to an action under section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018.

The court shall not under this section disapply section 12(1) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 11 F87, 11A(4) or 11B(2) or (4).

If, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the M12Fatal Accidents Act 1976 because of the time limit in Article 29 in Schedule 1 to the M13Carriage by Air Act 1961, the court has no power to direct that section 12(1) shall not apply.

But where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 11, the court may disapply section 12(1) in its application to an overseas armed forces action only if the person died within the period of six years beginning with the section 11 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to section 11(5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term).

The court shall not under this section disapply section 12(2) in its application to an overseas armed forces action if the action was brought after the expiration of the period of six years from the section 12 relevant date (see subsection (7)).

In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 11 F88, 11A(4) or 11B(2) or (4), he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased.

In a case under subsection (4) above, or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on the date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) above shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit.

In subsection (5A) references to “the operational context” are to the fact that the events to which the action relates took place in the context of overseas operations, and include references to the exceptional demands and stresses to which members of Her Majesty's forces are subject.

A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 12(1) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 1(1) of the M14Fatal Accidents Act 1976.

In this section—

• “the court” means the court in which the action has been brought;

• “Her Majesty's forces” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see section 374 of that Act);

• “overseas operations” means any operations outside the British Islands, including peacekeeping operations and operations for dealing with terrorism, civil unrest or serious public disorder, in the course of which members of Her Majesty's forces come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance;

• “the section 11 relevant date” means the latest of the following—

  1. a

     the date from which the period of three years starts to run in accordance with section 11(4) or (5);

  2. b

     where section 28 applies, the date from which the period of three years mentioned in subsection (1) of that section (as that subsection has effect with the modification made by subsection (6) of that section) starts to run;

  3. c

     where section 32(1)(a) or (b) applies, the date from which the period of three years starts to run in accordance with subsection (1) of that section;

• “the section 12 relevant date” means the latest of the following—

  1. a

     the date from which the period of three years starts to run in accordance with section 12(2);

  2. b

     where section 28 applies, the date from which the period of three years mentioned in subsection (1) of that section (as that subsection has effect with the modification made by subsection (6) of that section) starts to run.

For the purposes of initiating judicial proceedings, the time limit expires instead at the end of eight weeks after the non-binding ADR procedure ends (subject to subsection (4)).

If a time limit has been extended by this section, subsections (2) and (3) apply to the extended time limit as they apply to a time limit mentioned in subsection (2)(a).

Where more than one time limit applies in relation to a relevant dispute, the extension by subsection (3) of one of those time limits does not affect the others.

For the purposes of this section, a non-binding ADR procedure starts in relation to a relevant dispute on the date when the dispute is first sent or otherwise communicated to the ADR entity in accordance with the entity’s rules regarding the submission of complaints.

For the purpose of subsection (7), a qualifying request is a request by a party that another (A) confirm to all parties that A is continuing with the non-binding ADR procedure.

In the case of any relevant dispute, references in this section to a non-binding ADR procedure are references to the non-binding ADR procedure so far as it relates to that dispute, and references to a party are to be read accordingly.