Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (recast) (Text with EEA relevance)

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Article 16U.K.General principles of capacity allocation and congestion management

1.Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market-based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators involved. Network congestion problems shall be solved by means of non-transaction-based methods, namely methods that do not involve a selection between the contracts of individual market participants. When taking operational measures to ensure that its transmission system remains in the normal state, the transmission system operator [F1must consider, so far as possible,] the effect of those measures on neighbouring control areas and coordinate such measures with other affected transmission system operators F2....

2.Transaction curtailment procedures shall be used only in emergency situations, namely where the transmission system operator must act in an expeditious manner and redispatching or countertrading is not possible. Any such procedure shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Except in cases of force majeure, market participants that have been allocated capacity shall be compensated for any such curtailment.

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4.The maximum level of capacity of the interconnections and the transmission networks affected by cross-border capacity shall be made available to market participants complying with the safety standards of secure network operation. Counter-trading and redispatch, including cross-border redispatch, shall be used to maximise available capacities F4....

5.Capacity shall be allocated by means of explicit capacity auctions or implicit auctions including both capacity and energy. Both methods may coexist on the same interconnection. F5...

6.In the case of congestion, the valid highest value bids for network capacity, whether implicit or explicit, offering the highest value for the scarce transmission capacity in a given timeframe, shall be successful. Other than in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 or Article 63 of this Regulation, establishing reserve prices in capacity-allocation methods shall be prohibited.

7.Capacity shall be freely tradable on a secondary basis, provided that the transmission system operator is informed sufficiently in advance. Where a transmission system operator refuses any secondary trade (transaction), this shall be clearly and transparently communicated and explained to all the market participants by that transmission system operator and notified to the regulatory authority.

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Where a derogation is granted, the F8... transmission system operators shall develop and publish a methodology and projects that shall provide a long-term solution to the issue that the derogation seeks to address. The derogation shall expire when the time limit for the derogation is reached or when the solution is applied, whichever is earlier.

10.Market participants shall inform the transmission system operators concerned within a reasonable period in advance of the relevant operational period whether they intend to use allocated capacity. Any allocated capacity that is not going to be used shall be made available again to the market, in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

11.As far as technically possible, transmission system operators shall net the capacity requirements of any power flows in opposite directions over the congested interconnection line in order to use that line to its maximum capacity. Having full regard to network security, transactions that relieve the congestion shall not be refused.

12.The financial consequences of a failure to honour obligations associated with the allocation of capacity shall be attributed to the transmission system operators F9... who are responsible for such a failure. Where market participants fail to use the capacity that they have committed to use, or, in the case of explicitly auctioned capacity, fail to trade capacity on a secondary basis or give the capacity back in due time, those market participants shall lose the rights to such capacity and shall pay a cost-reflective charge. Any cost-reflective charges for the failure to use capacity shall be justified and proportionate. If a transmission system operator does not fulfil its obligation of providing firm transmission capacity, it shall be liable to compensate the market participant for the loss of capacity rights. Consequential losses shall not be taken into account for that purpose. The key concepts and methods for the determination of liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations shall be set out in advance in respect of the financial consequences, and shall be subject to review by the F10... regulatory authority.

13.When allocating costs of remedial actions between transmission system operators, [F11the regulatory authority] shall analyse to what extent flows resulting from transactions internal to bidding zones contribute to F12... observed [F13congestion], and allocate the costs based on the contribution to the congestion to the transmission system operators of the bidding zones creating such flows except for costs induced by flows resulting from transactions internal to bidding zones that are below the level that could be expected without structural congestion in a bidding zone.

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Textual Amendments

F1Words in Art. 16(1) substituted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(2)(a)

F2Words in Art. 16(1) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(2)(b)

F3Art. 16(3) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(3)

F4Words in Art. 16(4) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(4)

F5Words in Art. 16(5) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(5)

F6Art. 16(8) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(6)

F7Words in Art. 16(9) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(7)(a)

F8Word in Art. 16(9) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(7)(b)

F9Words in Art. 16(12) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(8)(a)

F10Word in Art. 16(12) omitted (E.W.S.) (31.12.2020) by virtue of The Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1006), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 15(8)(b)